TCP Connection Management Mechanisms for Improving Internet Server Performance by Shukla, Amol
TCP Connection Management Mechanisms for




presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the




Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2005
c©Amol Shukla, 2005
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION FOR ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION OF A THESIS
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis,
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
ii
Abstract
This thesis investigates TCP connection management mechanisms in order to under-
stand the behaviour and improve the performance of Internet servers during overload condi-
tions such as flash crowds. We study several alternatives for implementing TCP connection
establishment, reviewing approaches taken by existing TCP stacks as well as proposing new
mechanisms to improve server throughput and reduce client response times under overload.
We implement some of these connection establishment mechanisms in the Linux TCP stack
and evaluate their performance in a variety of environments. We also evaluate the cost
of supporting half-closed connections at the server and assess the impact of an abortive
release of connections by clients on the throughput of an overloaded server. Our evaluation
demonstrates that connection establishment mechanisms that eliminate the TCP-level re-
transmission of connection attempts by clients increase server throughput by up to 40%
and reduce client response times by two orders of magnitude. Connection termination
mechanisms that preclude support for half-closed connections additionally improve server
throughput by up to 18%.
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The goal of this thesis is to understand the behaviour of overloaded Internet servers, and to
improve their throughput and reduce client response times by examining implementation
choices for TCP connection establishment and termination.
1.2 Motivation
The demand for Internet-based services has exploded over the last decade. Many organi-
zations use the Internet and particularly the World Wide Web (often referred to as “the
web”) as their primary medium for communication and business. This phenomenal growth
has dramatically increased the performance requirements for Internet servers.
The ubiquitous nature of web browsers has given rise to the occurrence of flash crowds1,
where a large number of users simultaneously access a particular web site. Flash crowds
are characterized by a rapid and dramatic surge in the volume of requests arriving at a
web site, prolonged periods of overload (i.e., load in excess of the server’s capacity), and
are often triggered without advance warning. In the hours following the September 11th
1The term “flash crowd” was coined by Larry Niven in a science fiction short story, where huge crowds
would materialize in places of interesting events with the availability of cheap teleportation [5].
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terrorist attacks, many media web sites such as CNN and MSNBC were overwhelmed with
more than an order of magnitude increase in traffic, pushing their availability to 0% and
their response time to over 47 seconds [38, 25, 68]. A previously unpopular web site can
see a huge influx of requests after being mentioned in well-known newsfeeds or discussion
sites, resulting in saturation and unavailability – this is popularly known as the Slashdot
effect [2].
In many web systems, once client demand exceeds the server’s capacity, the server
throughput drops sharply, and the client response time increases significantly. Ironically, it
is precisely during these periods of high demand that a web site’s quality of service matters
the most. For example, an earthquake monitoring web site will often see significant user
traffic only in the aftermath of an earthquake [87]. Over-provisioning the capacity in web
systems is often inadequate. Server capacity needs to be increased by at least 4-5 times
to deal with even moderate flash crowds, and the added capacity tends to be more than
82% idle during normal loads [5]. Bhatti and Friedrich summarize the case against over-
provisioning to protect against flash crowds, “brute force server resource provisioning is
not fiscally prudent since no reasonable amount of hardware can guarantee predictable
performance for flash crowds” [15].
Web servers thus form a critical part of the Internet infrastructure and it is imperative
to ensure that they provide reasonable performance during overload conditions such as
flash crowds. The client-server interaction on the web is based on HTTP, which uses TCP
connections to transfer data between the end-points. Past work [47] has reported that the
escalation in traffic during flash crowds occurs largely because of an increase in the number
of clients, resulting in an increase in the number of TCP connections that a server has to
handle.
In this thesis, we study several different implementation choices for TCP connection
management in order to understand their impact on server throughput and client response
times under overload. In particular, we examine different approaches to implementing TCP
connection establishment (i.e., the three-way handshake) at the server. We also investigate
alternatives to the standard four-way TCP connection termination at both end-points.
We evaluate the cost of supporting half-closed connections at the server and assess the
impact of an abortive release of connections by clients on server throughput. Some of the
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connection management mechanisms examined in this thesis not only increase the server
throughput significantly, but they also reduce the client response time2 by more than
two orders of magnitude under overload. While we use web servers to evaluate different
connection management mechanisms, the results presented in this thesis also apply to other
TCP-based, connection-oriented Internet servers that can get overloaded.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis is concerned with servers that are subjected to overload conditions and makes
the following contributions:
1. We provide a better understanding of server behaviour during overload. We describe
some of the causes of the drop in server throughput and the increase in client response
times.
2. TCP stack developers in Linux, various flavours of UNIX, and Windows have taken
different approaches toward implementing connection establishment. It is not clear
to a systems programmer, an administrator, or even a TCP stack developer, which
of these approaches provide better server performance. We examine different imple-
mentation choices for TCP connection establishment, reviewing their advantages and
disadvantages. In the process, we demonstrate that the default implementation of
connection establishment in the Linux kernel can result in a disconnect between the
TCP states at the client and the server, causing unnecessary traffic in the network
and at the server.
3. We propose two new connection establishment mechanisms intended to alleviate
server traffic under overload. Our mechanisms require modifications only to the
TCP stack implementation at the server. No changes are required to the protocol
specifications, client-side TCP stacks and applications, or server-side applications.
We have implemented both of these alternatives in Linux, along with some of the
2Note that we use the term “client response time” in this thesis to denote the average response time
measured at the clients.
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connection establishment mechanisms currently in place in TCP stacks on UNIX and
Windows. We evaluate the performance of these mechanisms in a variety of envi-
ronments – using two different web servers (a traditional user-space server as well
as a high-performance kernel-space server). We demonstrate that mechanisms that
eliminate the retransmission of connection attempts by the client-side TCP stacks
significantly improve server throughput and reduce client response times by more
than two orders of magnitude.
4. We describe a mechanism that allows an early discard of client connection establish-
ment packets under overload. This mechanism relies only on existing data structures
available in the Linux TCP stack, does not require an external admission control
technique, and ensures that the server is never under-utilized.
5. We evaluate the cost of supporting half-closed TCP connections (which occur when
client applications initiate connection termination, for example, on a timeout) on
server throughput. We show how supporting half-closed TCP connections can result
in an imprudent use of resources at the server and describe a connection termina-
tion mechanism that disables the support for half-closed connections. Some web
browsers, in particular Internet Explorer, terminate their TCP connections using an
abortive release (i.e., by sending a reset (RST) to terminate connections). We exam-
ine whether the abortive release of connections by client applications has an impact
on server throughput. Our evaluation indicates that disabling support for half-closed
connections as well as an abortive release of connections by clients improves server
throughput by more than 15%.
1.4 Outline
Chapter 2 provides background information for this thesis and reviews related research.
Chapter 3 describes the experimental environment, workloads, and the methodology used
in this thesis. Chapter 4 outlines the problems with the existing TCP connection estab-
lishment mechanism in Linux. It examines solutions to address these problems, reviews
approaches implemented in other TCP stacks, and introduces two novel connection es-
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tablishment mechanisms. Chapter 4 also examines the alternatives to the existing TCP
connection termination mechanism. It includes the evaluation of different connection es-
tablishment and termination mechanisms on a workload representative of flash crowds.
Chapter 5 presents additional evaluation of some of these mechanisms in different environ-
ments, namely, with different workloads, client timeouts, and server platforms, as well as
under bursty traffic. It also presents a mechanism that allows an early discard of connec-
tion establishment packets from clients during overload. Chapter 6 contains a summary of
our findings and outlines some ideas for future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we review information required for the rest of this thesis and discuss previ-
ous related research. We first describe how TCP connection establishment and termination
is currently implemented in most TCP stacks, examining the Linux implementation in de-
tail. We then discuss previous research efforts to improve Internet server performance and
address server overload during flash crowds.
2.1 Background – TCP Connection Management
Application-layer Internet protocols such as HTTP use TCP as a reliable transport for
exchanging data between the client and the server. A typical HTTP interaction between
a client and a server consists of the client establishing a TCP connection with the server,
sending an HTTP request, receiving the server response, and terminating the connection.
Multiple rounds of request-response transactions can take place over a single TCP con-
nection if both of the end-points use persistent connections available in HTTP 1.1. In the
following sections, we describe how connection establishment and termination is currently
implemented in the Linux TCP stack.
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2.1.1 TCP Connection Establishment
TCP is a connection-oriented protocol that requires a connection to be established be-
fore end-points can exchange data. TCP connection establishment involves a three-way
handshake between the end-points [73, 80]. The handshake has three steps to reduce the
possibility of false connections [73]1. Figure 2.1 illustrates the implementation of the three-
way handshake in Linux. We use the implementation of TCP connection establishment in
Linux as a representative example, other TCP stacks implement connection establishment
in a similar fashion. Note that the TCP connection states at the end-points appear in bold
letters in Figure 2.1.
A server-side application, for example, a web server, creates a socket and binds it to
a well-known port. It then executes the listen() system call to notify the server TCP
stack2 of its willingness to accept incoming connections on the listening socket.
A client-side application, for example, a web browser, initiates a connection by creating
a socket and issuing the connect() system call. This causes the client TCP stack to send
a SYN segment to the specified server. Upon receiving a SYN, the server TCP stack
creates an entry identifying the client’s connection request in the listening socket’s SYN
queue (sometimes called the SYN backlog). It then acknowledges the SYN by sending a
SYN/ACK segment. The handshake is complete when the client TCP stack acknowledges
the SYN/ACK with an ACK, which signifies that both sides have completed connection
establishment. We will refer to the ACK sent by the client in response to a SYN/ACK as
SYN/ACK ACK to distinguish it from other ACK segments used by TCP.
Upon receiving the SYN/ACK ACK, the server TCP stack creates a new socket, adds
it to the listening socket’s listen queue (sometimes called the accept queue), and removes
the associated entry from the SYN queue. In order to communicate with the client, the
server application has to issue the accept() system call, which removes the socket from
the listen queue and returns an associated socket descriptor to the application. Both sides
can thereafter use read() and write() calls3 to exchange data. Note that in most socket
1As described in RFC 793 [73], “The principle reason for the three-way handshake is to prevent old
duplicate connection initiations from causing confusion” with new connection attempts.
2The terms “server TCP stack” and “client TCP stack” to used to imply the server-side and client-side
functionality provided by the TCP stack in an operating system.
3We use read() and write() to refer to the entire family of system calls to read and write data to/from
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Figure 2.1: TCP connection establishment procedure in Linux
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API implementations, the three-way connection establishment procedure is completed by
the server TCP stack before the application issues an accept() call4.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the server TCP stack uses two separate queues per listening
socket to keep track of client segments used for connection establishment. The SYN queue5
stores information (including the peer’s IP address and port number, the TCP options used
in the SYN, as well as the timestamp) about incomplete (half-open) connections, which
are in the SYN RECV TCP state.
The listen queue contains ESTABLISHED connections that are waiting for an accept()
call from the server application. It is important to note that although we use terms such as
“the SYN queue” and “the listen queue” in this thesis, these queues are in fact maintained
on a per-listening-socket basis in the Linux TCP stack. The sizes of both of these queues
are fixed and each entry consumes a portion of the available kernel memory.
Figure 2.2 summarizes the flow of TCP segments used for connection establishment.
SYN segments arrive at the server based on the aggregate client connection rate. The
server TCP stack creates entries for these connections in the SYN queue and responds
with SYN/ACKs (provided there is space in the SYN and listen queues). An entry is
normally retained in the SYN queue for the duration of one round trip time (RTT) to the
client. That is, entries occupy space in the SYN queue while the server’s SYN/ACK and
the corresponding SYN/ACK ACK from the client are in transit in the network. Upon
receiving a SYN/ACK ACK, the associated connection entry is removed from the SYN
queue, and a new socket is created and added to the tail of the listen queue (provided
there is space in the listen queue). When the server application issues an accept() system
call (the frequency of which depends on the application’s connection acceptance rate), the
entry at the head of the listen queue is removed and a socket descriptor identifying the
connection is returned to the application.
The server TCP stack might not always be in a position to accommodate a SYN or a
SYN/ACK ACK, this happens primarily when the SYN or the listen queue is full. The
queues may become full because the rate of incoming client connection attempts is higher
a socket.
4We will discuss the exceptions in Section 4.1.2.
5The SYN queue is actually implemented as a hash table to allow for an efficient lookup of the associated
incomplete connection when a SYN/ACK arrives – the term “queue” is used for historical reasons.
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Figure 2.2: Flow of TCP segments used for connection establishment
than the rate at which the server application is able to accept and process new connections
(i.e., the server is under overload). A SYN or SYN/ACK ACK segment that cannot be
accommodated has to be dropped, we refer to this scenario as a queue drop. By our
definition, queue drops occur only during the TCP connection establishment phase, either
at the SYN stage (i.e., upon receiving a SYN) or the ACK stage (i.e., upon receiving a
SYN/ACK ACK). Note the distinction between queue drops and generic packet drops,
which may occur at any step during packet processing in the networking stack or even
before the packet reaches the server. We now detail the causes of queue drops in the Linux
TCP stack.
When a well-formed SYN segment is received (i.e., excluding segments which do not
satisfy the TCP Protect Against Wrapped Sequences (PAWS) check, or those with incor-
rectly set flags such as IP broadcast), queue drops may occur only for one of the following
reasons.
1. The SYN queue is full.
2. The listen queue is full and there are at least two entries in the SYN queue whose
SYN/ACK timers have not expired.
3. The kernel cannot allocate memory to create an entry in the SYN queue.
4. The SYN queue is three-quarters full and TCP SYN cookies6 are not enabled.
5. The TCP stack is unable to transmit a SYN/ACK because it cannot find a route to
the destination.
We have found that in practice in our environment, SYN segments are dropped under
high loads only because of two reasons – the SYN queue is three-quarters full (we refer to
6We discuss SYN cookies in Section 4.1.6.
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this rule as SynQ3/4Full) or the listen queue is full (we refer to this rule as ListenQFul-
lAtSyn).
When a well-formed SYN/ACK ACK segment arrives, queue drops may occur only for
one of the following reasons.
1. The lookup for a network route to the destination fails.
2. The listen queue is full.
3. The kernel cannot allocate memory while attempting to create a new socket.
In our environment, SYN/ACK ACK segments are dropped under high loads only be-
cause the listen queue is full (we refer to this rule as ListenQOverflow). Note the distinction
between ListenQFullAtSyn and ListenQOverflow – the former rule is enforced at the SYN
stage while the later rule is invoked at the ACK stage. The kernel TCP code does not
have special names for any of the queue drops. We chose the names for these rules for
clarity and we will use them throughout this thesis. The Linux TCP stack takes a conser-
vative approach when the listen queue is full, and tries to drop connection establishment
attempts earlier (at the SYN stage through the ListenQFullAtSyn rule) rather than later
(at the ACK stage through the ListenQOverflow rule). A similar approach can be found in
other open-source TCP stacks such as FreeBSD. The early drop of SYN segments when the
SYN queue is only three-quarters full, as opposed to waiting for it to be completely full,
is a simple measure against SYN flood attacks in the absence of SYN cookies. While the
effectiveness of dropping SYN segments when the SYN queue is just three-quarters full is
unclear, the only way to disable it is by modifying the kernel TCP stack code. Since many
existing production Linux systems operate without any custom TCP stack modifications,
we run all of our experiments without any modifications to the SynQ3/4Full rule. Note
that in our discussion of TCP connection establishment, we do not consider the possibility
of simultaneous opening of connections by the end-points. In this thesis, we are primarily
concerned with a typical client-server environment, such as a web browser interacting with
a web server, there are no simultaneous connection openings in this environment.
TCP stack developers in different operating systems have taken different approaches to
implementing TCP connection establishment. Most TCP stacks use per-socket SYN and
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listen queues, and implement rules similar to the ones used in Linux to effect queue drops.
Others utilize techniques such as SYN cookies [14] or SYN cache [54] to reduce the state
information about incomplete connections stored at the server. However, implementations
differ most significantly in how they handle queue drops at the server [45]. In Linux,
SYN segments as well as SYN/ACK ACK segments are dropped silently when they trigger
a queue drop. That is, no notification is sent to clients about these dropped segments.
Most 4.2 BSD-derived TCP stacks, such as those in FreeBSD, HP-UX, and Solaris, only
drop SYN segments silently [45]. That is, whenever a SYN/ACK ACK is dropped due
to ListenQOverflow, a TCP reset (RST) segment is sent to the client notifying it of the
server’s inability to continue with the connection. In contrast, some Windows TCP stacks
do not drop either of these connection establishment segments silently, sending a RST to
the client every time there is a queue drop. Note that in TCP, segments (except RSTs) that
are not acknowledged by the server within a particular amount of time are retransmitted
by the client.
In this thesis, we describe and critique several different approaches to handling queue
drops. We are interested in answering the following question – TCP stack developers in
Linux, various flavours of UNIX7 and Windows have taken different approaches to im-
plementing connection establishment. Which of these approaches, if any, result in better
Internet server performance under overload? We also present two novel mechanisms de-
signed to eliminate the retransmission of TCP connection establishment segments in order
to increase server throughput and reduce client response times.
2.1.2 TCP Connection Termination
A TCP connection is full-duplex and both sides can terminate their end of the connection
independently through a “FIN-ACK” handshake after they finish sending data [73]. That
is, an end-point transmits a FIN to indicate that it is not going to send any more data
on a connection. The other end-point sends an ACK confirming the FIN. This method of
connection termination is called “graceful close”.
7Unless otherwise specified, we refer to the TCP stacks in various commercial as well as open-source
UNIX variants as UNIX TCP stacks.
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Graceful connection closure is implemented with either half-closed (also called full-
duplex) or half-duplex termination semantics. The terms “half-closed” and “half-duplex”
are described in RFC 1122 [17]. The CLOSE operation outlined in RFC 793 allows for
a connection to be “half closed”, that is, closed in only one direction, allowing an end-
point that sends a FIN to receive data from its peer in the other direction. Some socket
APIs provide the shutdown() system call to provide half-closed connection semantics,
enabling applications to shutdown the sending side of their connection, while allowing
activity on the receiving side through subsequent read() calls to obtain data sent by the
peer. Figure 3.1(a) illustrates the half-closed connection termination process.
Most applications, however, use the close() system call to terminate both the sending
as well as the receiving directions of the connection by treating the connection as if it is half-
duplex [80]. RFC 1122, which “amends, corrects and supplements” RFC 793, specifies –
“A host may implement a ‘half-duplex’ TCP close sequence, so that an application that
has called CLOSE cannot continue to read data from the connection. If such a host
issues a CLOSE call while received data is still pending in TCP, or if new data is received
after CLOSE is called, its TCP should send a RST to show that data was lost.” [17].
Figure 3.1(b) illustrates half-duplex connection termination. A close() call typically
returns immediately [1] (unless certain SO LINGER options have been set) and destroys
the socket descriptor (assuming no other process holds a reference to it), so the application
loses its reference to the TCP connection. Thus, the half-duplex semantics entailed by the
close() call imply that any data received from a peer after sending a FIN will not be read
by the application, but will result in a RST instead.
As shown in Figure 2.3, any client-initiated graceful connection termination, either with
half-closed or half-duplex connection semantics, results in a FIN being sent to the server.
Upon receiving a FIN segment, most server TCP stacks, including Linux, assume that
the client uses half-closed semantics. That is, they support half-closed client connections
by default. However, most HTTP clients (e.g., web browsers) do not terminate connec-
tions using half-closed connection semantics. Instead, they use the close() system call to
terminate both ends of a connection. Thus, server TCP stacks assume that client applica-
tions are using the shutdown() system call to terminate connections, however, most client
applications in fact use the close() system call. In this thesis, we demonstrate how sup-
13
(a) Half-Closed Termination (b) Half-Duplex Termination
Figure 2.3: TCP connection termination procedures
porting half-closed connections can result in an imprudent use of resources at the server,
especially during overload. The effort spent by the server to generate and write replies
after receiving a FIN from a client is wasted when a client application does not read those
replies. We present an alternative connection termination mechanism that disables support
for half-closed connections. This allows us to evaluate the cost of supporting half-closed
connections when the server is overloaded.
Instead of graceful closure, an application can force a connection to be terminated
through an abortive release, which causes the TCP stack to send a reset (RST) segment to
its peer. RFC 793 and RFC 2616 [32] strongly discourage the use of an abortive release to
terminate connections as a part of normal operations. However, some client applications, in
particular, Internet Explorer 5 and 6 (which are currently the most popular web browsers),
terminate all of their connections by forcing the client TCP stack to send a RST [8]. The
reason why Internet Explorer uses an abortive release to terminate connections is not clear.
In this thesis, we examine whether the abortive release of connections can improve server
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throughput under high loads.
2.2 Related Work – Improving Server Performance
under Overload
Research in Internet server performance over the years has included application and op-
erating system interface improvements, networking subsystem enhancements, as well as
techniques to address server overload during flash crowds. In this section, we review past
work in this area as it relates to this thesis.
2.2.1 Application and Operating System Improvements
Modern Internet servers have to handle thousands of simultaneous connections [13]. Re-
searchers have proposed different server architectures for efficiently handling this high level
of concurrency. These8 include – (i) event-driven architectures [70, 19], where connections
are multiplexed over a few event-driven server processes (often just a single process), which
use an event notification mechanism such as the select() system call to work on mul-
tiple connections without blocking for I/O, (ii) multi-threaded or multi-process architec-
tures [70, 86], in which the server associates each connection with a thread or a process,
and relies on the operating system or a library to continue processing connections that
are not blocked, and (iii) hybrid architectures such as the Staged Event Driven Architec-
ture [88]. Other researchers have suggested modifications in operating system interfaces
and mechanisms for efficiently delivering information about the state of socket and file
descriptors to user-space Internet servers [13, 22, 53, 29, 67]. Past research has also exam-
ined techniques to improve server performance by reducing the data copied between the
kernel and user-space applications [69], implementing the transmission of data with zero
copying [82, 66], and reducing the number of kernel boundary crossings [66, 67]. In light
of the considerable demand placed on operating systems, some researchers have sought to
improve the performance of Internet servers by migrating part or all of their functionality
into the kernel [84, 39, 46].
8This taxonomy of server architectures is provided by Pai et al. [70].
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The connection management mechanisms examined in this thesis operate at a lower
level (i.e., at the networking stack implementation level) and are complementary to these
application and operating system interface improvements. These application and operating
system improvements take effect only after a connection is established. They also have no
impact on connection termination. In fact, we use many of these improvements, which
constitute current “best practices”, in our evaluation of different connection management
mechanisms.
Event Scheduling in Internet Servers
Recent research has identified the scheduling of events as an important issue in the de-
sign of Internet servers. Note the distinction between connection scheduling and event
scheduling. Connection scheduling mechanisms seek to minimize the average response
time for client connections by applying techniques such as Shortest-Remaining-Processing-
Time-first (SRPT) to connections in a user-space server [28] and size-based scheduling in
network transmit queues [76]. Ruan and Pai [74] have challenged the effectiveness of these
mechanisms, suggesting that connection scheduling opportunities are an artifact of locking
and blocking implementations in the operating system. Since connection scheduling takes
effect only after a connection has been established and operates at a lower priority than
network packet processing, we do not expect it to have any impact on the mechanisms
considered in this thesis.
Event scheduling seeks to improve server throughput by maintaining a balance between
accepting new connections and making forward progress on existing connections [22, 19,
72, 86]. Such mechanisms typically modify the accept strategy used by Internet servers
to drain the listen queue aggressively, whenever the server accepts new connections. By
accepting new connections aggressively, servers that are under overload can reduce (but
not eliminate) queue drops arising from ListenQFullAtSyn or ListenQOverflow [19, 72]. In
our evaluation, we use two web servers configured to aggressively accept new connections.
We expect that the connection establishment mechanisms reviewed in this thesis will have
an even greater impact on the throughput and the response time provided by servers such
as Apache, which do not drain the listen queue aggressively, and consequently have more
queue drops (in Linux as well as other UNIX TCP stacks).
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It is important to maintain a balance between accepting new connections and com-
pleting work on existing connections – a mechanism that accepts new connections too
aggressively can result in degraded server throughput. Ostrowski [67] describes a mech-
anism called auto-accept, which operates in the framework of a special kernel subsystem
called Scalable Event Notification and Delivery (SEND). In this mechanism, the networking
subsystem in the kernel automatically accepts a connection on behalf of an application af-
ter the three-way handshake has been completed, without requiring an explicit accept()
system call. Unfortunately, a strategy such as auto-accept accepts connections too ag-
gressively under overload and causes the kernel to spend most of its time completing the
three-way TCP handshake and accepting connections, thereby preventing the server appli-
cation from making forward progress on accepted connections. The use of auto-accept also
results in a virtually unbounded listen queue, ensuring that there are no queue drops due
to ListenQOverflow or ListenQFullAtSyn9. An unbounded listen queue can create memory
pressure at the server because the kernel has to allocate socket entries to track the state of
each accepted connection. We believe that the auto-accept mechanism is responsible for
the lack of good performance in the SEND subsystem [18]. The size of the listen queue is
bounded in most TCP stacks for good reason – as indicated by queueing theory, limiting
the queue size acts as an implicit admission control mechanism that ensures that server
applications have access to resources to complete work on accepted connections under high
loads.
2.2.2 Networking Subsystem Improvements
In this section we review research proposing modifications to the TCP/IP networking sub-
system in order to improve Internet server performance. We discuss both implementation
changes as well as protocol modifications proposed in past work.
9The auto-accept mechanism can thus eliminate all queue drops when used in conjunction with tech-
niques such as SYN cookies, which provide an unbounded SYN queue.
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Implementation Improvements
In traditional networking stacks, whenever a network card in the server receives a packet, it
signals an (hardware) interrupt, and the operating system runs an interrupt service routine,
which is typically part of the device driver. The device driver then creates a buffer (called
skbuff in Linux and mbuf in BSD) encapsulating the packet, places it on the IP queue,
and posts a software interrupt. Later on, a kernel thread is run (in the software interrupt
context) to pull packets from the IP queue, process them (e.g., reassemble fragmented
packets), and pass them on to the transport layer, which performs further processing (e.g.,
places the data in a TCP segment in an appropriate socket queue). Thus, the protocol
processing for an incoming packet occurs at a higher priority than user-space applications
(e.g., web servers). This can result in receive livelock [63] under high load, where the
server spends all its time processing interrupts, without giving user-space applications any
opportunity to run. Receive livelock drives the overall system throughput to zero because
no progress can be made on received packets. Various solutions have been proposed to
address the receive livelock problem, these include interrupt throttling (also known as
interrupt batching or interrupt coalescence), resorting to interrupt-initiated polling during
overload [63], and early packet demultiplexing accompanied with protocol packet processing
at the priority of the receiving process [30].
Linux implements interrupt-initiated polling through the NAPI (New API) frame-
work [75]. With NAPI, a driver registers a device (e.g., the network card) for work following
a hardware interrupt, and disables further interrupts from that device. A kernel thread
later polls all registered devices for packets, and enables interrupts only when the device
does not have more packets to send10. NAPI implements many of the ideas proposed by
Mogul and Ramakrishnan [63] including the elimination of the IP queue and an early dis-
card of packets on the network card under overload. NAPI also ensures that other tasks in
the system (e.g., the web server) get an opportunity to run by making the polling thread
preemptible. We use NAPI in the evaluation in this thesis because it is a well-known solu-
tion to prevent receive livelock at an overloaded server. While NAPI obviates the need for
10For fairness, each device is allocated a quota on how many packets it can send, however, polling is still
used as long as the device has more packets to send.
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techniques such as interrupt throttling, our preliminary results using interrupt throttling11
were qualitatively similar to those using NAPI.
Clark et al. [24] provide insight into why TCP processing can be slow and describe
optimizations to make it fast. The improvements outlined include “fast path” processing
to optimize the common case of data transfer while a connection is established, TCP input
and output header prediction, and low-overhead timer management. Clark et al. suggest
that the protocol aspects of TCP do not cause a significant packet-processing overhead.
That is, it is not necessary to revise TCP, it is only necessary to implement TCP efficiently
to support high performance. Many of the implementation improvements outlined by Clark
et al. have been since implemented in production TCP stacks. Kay and Pasquale [50] mea-
sure processing overhead of the TCP/IP implementation in Ultrix. They report that the
processing time for long TCP messages is dominated by data touching operations (e.g.,
copying and checksum computation), and propose a checksum redundancy avoidance algo-
rithm to disable checksum computation whenever the link layer provides cyclic redundancy
check in LAN environments. They also show that it is difficult to significantly reduce the
processing costs for short TCP messages (which are common in HTTP). Processing time
for such messages is spread over many non-data-touching operations, whose overhead costs
are relatively constant. Their work suggests that it is important to design application-layer
protocols to reduce the number of short TCP messages. While Clark et al. and Kay and
Pasquale assess the overhead of common operations on established connections in TCP im-
plementations, in this thesis, we evaluate the overhead of TCP connection establishment
and termination during periods of heavy load such as flash crowds.
Early networking stacks did not handle large number of TCP connections efficiently.
McKenney and Dove [57] demonstrated the superiority of hash table based approaches
over linked-list implementations for connection state (Protocol Control Block) lookup.
The Linux TCP stack uses hash tables to demultiplex incoming TCP segments in a similar
fashion. Previous work [31, 9] has reported a degradation in throughput due to the memory
and CPU overheads arising from the management of a large number of connections in the
TIME WAIT state at the server TCP stack. Faber et al. [31] propose protocol modifications
to TCP as well as HTTP to shift the TIME WAIT state to the clients. Aron and Druschel [9]
11We used the e1000 device driver. Note that not all drivers support interrupt throttling.
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propose TCP implementation modifications to reduce the overhead from connections in the
TIME WAIT state. Note that the server TCP stack has to enter the TIME WAIT state only
for those connections whose termination is initiated by the server application. While the
server-initiated termination is typical for HTTP 1.0 connections, HTTP 1.1 connections
are typically terminated by the client12. In this thesis, we focus on client-initiated con-
nection termination in order to highlight the issues related to supporting half-closed TCP
connections at the server and to evaluate the performance impact of an abortive release of
connections by client applications. Consequently, there are no connections in TIME WAIT
state at the server.
Researchers have argued for offloading part or all of the functionality in a TCP stack
on to a network card [4, 62, 36]. Modern network cards include support for the offloading
of checksum computation and segmentation for large packet sends. We use checksum of-
floading in our evaluation and segmentation is not required for our workloads. Freimuth
et al. [36] describe an architecture that offloads the entire TCP stack on to the network
card, providing the server operating system with a high level interface (i.e., sockets) to the
network card. This facilitates large data transfers, eliminates interrupts and bus crossings
resulting from “uninteresting” transport-level events (e.g., TCP window updates), and im-
proves memory reference behaviour in the operating system. Turner et al. [83] describe a
networking stack architecture to improve the throughput and latency of TCP-based server
applications. In their architecture, one or more processor cores in the server are dedi-
cated to packet processing and communication data structures are exposed to applications
through an asynchronous interface, allowing them to bypass the operating system for most
I/O operations. Kaashoek et al. [48] introduce the notion of server operating systems,
which are a set of abstractions and runtime support for specialized, high-performance
server applications. Although these alternatives for the networking stack implementation
at the server are interesting, the connection management mechanisms studied in this thesis
operate at the protocol level and can be easily integrated with an offloaded or a specialized
implementation of the TCP stack. We believe that the implementation choices for TCP
connection management will continue to have an impact on server throughput and client
12However, the server can also terminate connections in HTTP 1.1, for example, when they are idle for
a long time.
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response times when implemented in dedicated or offloaded packet-processing stacks. As
indicated by Mogul [36], connection-management costs are either unsolved or worsened by
TCP offloading.
Researchers have proposed modifications to the conventional networking stack and
socket API implementations to support differentiated quality of service. These include
novel operating system abstractions [12], new operating system architectures [78], net-
working subsystem improvements [85], and new server architectures [15]. Voigt et al. [85]
describe a prioritized listen queue mechanism that supports different service classes by re-
ordering the listen queue based on the priorities assigned to incoming connections. While
the aggressive connection acceptance strategy used by our user-space server (which drains
the listen queue completely on every accept() call) obviates the effect of any reordering,
TCP stack or web server implementations could split the listen queue into multiple priority
queues [12, 15]. We do not take into account differentiated quality of service in this thesis,
treating all client TCP segments uniformly. That is, we assume that the overload at the
server is caused by clients who have the same priority. Since the connection management
mechanisms discussed in this thesis operate at the protocol level, they can be incorporated
into other networking stack implementations that provide better support for differentiated
service under overload.
Protocol Improvements
Nahum et al. [66] describe optimizations to reduce the per-TCP-connection overhead in
small HTTP exchanges. They propose a modification to system calls that write data to
notify the TCP stack of an impending connection termination to allow the piggybacking of
a FIN on the last data segment. The client TCP stack can also delay sending a SYN/ACK
ACK for 200 ms – within this time window, most HTTP client applications send a data
request, on which the SYN/ACK ACK can then be piggybacked. Similarly, a TCP stack
can delay the acknowledgement of the remote peer’s FIN for 200 ms to allow the piggy-
backing of its own FIN if the application issues a close() call within that time. All of
these optimizations reduce the number of TCP segments required for an HTTP transac-
tion, and improve server throughput by up to 18%. However, these optimizations do not
alleviate server load resulting from the retransmission of TCP connection establishment
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segments or preclude server support for half-closed connections. Hence, they complement
the implementation choices for TCP connection establishment and termination studied in
this thesis. We do note that both abortive connection release as well as our mechanism
for disabling support for half-closed connections at the server reduce the number of TCP
segments required for HTTP transactions.
Balakrishnan et al. [10] present a detailed analysis of TCP behaviour from traces ob-
tained from a busy web server. They conclude that existing TCP loss recovery mechanisms
are not effective in dealing with packet losses arising from short web transfers, and report
that web clients use parallel connections aggressively because throughput is positively cor-
related with the number of connections used. They provide server-side TCP modifications
to address these problems, including an enhanced loss recovery mechanism, and an inte-
grated approach to congestion control that treats simultaneous connections from a client
as a single unit to improve bandwidth sharing across all clients. Congestion control for
established TCP connections is still an area of active research. Congestion control and
loss recovery mechanisms are in effect only while a TCP connection is established. The
mechanisms studied in this thesis take effect before a TCP connection is established and
during its termination.
Following work by Mogul [61], the HTTP 1.1 specification [32] advocates the use of
persistent connections in order to alleviate server load as well as reduce network congestion
arising from the use of a separate TCP connection for every web request. It recommends
that a client application should maintain no more than 2 persistent connections with any
server. Unfortunately, as reported by Balakrishnan et al. [10] and Jamjoom and Shin [45],
current web clients open multiple simultaneous TCP connections in parallel with a server
in order to improve their overall throughput (by obtaining more than their “fair share” of
bandwidth), and reduce the client response time (since many web servers do not currently
support pipelining). The average number of requests per connection ranges between 1.2 to
2.7 in popular browsers [45], which indicates that current browsers do not issue too many
requests on a single HTTP 1.1 connection. Thus, servers have to handle significantly more
TCP connection establishment and termination attempts than envisioned when HTTP 1.1
was introduced.
TCP for Transactions (known as T/TCP) [16, 81] is a backwards-compatible extension
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of TCP for efficient transaction (request-response) oriented service. By using a monoton-
ically increasing connection count (CC) value in the options field of a TCP segment and
caching the last CC used at both the end-points, T/TCP allows the three-way handshake
mechanism to be bypassed while establishing connections. That is, a minimal T/TCP
request-response sequence requires of just 3 TCP segments – (i) a single segment from the
client containing the SYN, FIN, CC and the data request, (ii) the server acknowledgement
of the SYN, FIN and CC, which also includes its data response and its CC, and (iii) a final
segment from the client acknowledging that it has received the server’s data and FIN. Thus,
T/TCP allows application-layer protocols such as HTTP to connect to an end-point, send
data and close the connection using a TCP single segment, without resorting to HTTP
1.1-style persistent connections. The CC option in T/TCP also allows for the truncation
of the TIME WAIT TCP state. Unfortunately, T/TCP requires modifications to the TCP
stack at both the end-points and has not seen widespread deployment in the Internet. The
introduction of persistent connections in HTTP 1.1 as well as vulnerability to SYN flood
denial of service attacks due to a lack of compatibility with SYN cookies have inhibited
the widespread deployment of T/TCP. The lack of deployment of T/TCP implies that the
overhead of TCP connection establishment and termination is still high in current Internet
servers.
2.2.3 Addressing Server Overload during Flash Crowds
Many research efforts and commercial products implement admission control to improve
server performance during overload conditions such as flash crowds. Cherkasova et al. [23]
present a session-based admission control mechanism to ensure longer sessions are com-
pleted during overload. Welsh et al. [89] describe adaptive admission control techniques
to improve client response time in the Staged Event Driven Architecture [88]. Many web
servers return a “server busy” message if their application-level queues get full [40]. Bhatti
and Friedrich [15] describe a quality of service aware admission control mechanism that al-
lows an overloaded web server to focus on premium requests by dropping all other requests.
Unfortunately, all of these techniques perform admission control at the application-level.
That is, a client connection attempt requires copying and processing overhead in the driver,
the networking stack, and in some cases in the application, before it is dropped. Hence,
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these mechanisms often fail to improve the performance of overload servers [85, 40].
More sophisticated web systems use a server farm with a node at the front that performs
admission control. Such a front-end node13 can be a (hardware or software based) load
balancer, Layer-4 or Layer-7 switch, or traffic shaper. A number of web sites that face
overload due to flash crowds do not use a sophisticated web-farm architecture because
their normal load can be easily handled by a single web server. Additionally, most web-
farm architectures simply shift the burden of addressing overload to the front-end node.
The TCP connection management mechanisms examined in this thesis can be deployed
at either an overloaded front-end node or an individual web server to enhance system
throughput and reduce client response times.
Voigt et al. [85] describe a kernel-level mechanism called TCP SYN policing to allow
admission control and service differentiation when the server is overloaded. SYN policing
controls the acceptance rate of new connections (i.e., SYN segments) as well as the max-
imum number of concurrent connections based on connection attributes (e.g., the client
IP address) by using a token bucket based policer. SYN segments are dropped silently
by the policer. In fact, the authors rule out the possibility of sending a RST when a
SYN is dropped because it “incurs unnecessary extra overhead” and because some client
TCP stacks (particularly, those on Windows) do not follow the recommendations of RFC
793 and immediately send a new SYN after receiving a RST for a previous SYN. In this
thesis, we examine this assertion and evaluate the impact of both silent and explicit (i.e.,
accompanied with a RST) SYN drops on server throughput and response time with RFC
793-compliant as well as Windows-like client TCP stacks. We demonstrate that sending
a RST whenever a SYN is dropped reduces client response times by two orders of magni-
tude. While it increases server throughput with RFC 793-compliant TCP stacks, sending
a RST in response to a SYN fails to improve throughput with Windows-like client TCP
stacks, corroborating the hypothesis of Voigt et al. To counter this problem, we describe
a new connection establishment mechanism in this thesis that prevents the retransmission
of connection attempts, even in Windows client TCP stacks. This mechanism can be used
to enhance the effectiveness of SYN policing.
13While it is possible to use multiple front-ends with techniques such as round-robin DNS, we discuss a
single front-end scenario without loss of generality.
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Iyer et al. [40] describe an overload control mechanism that drops incoming requests at
the network card. They use a user-space monitoring application that instructs an intelligent
network card to drop TCP connection attempts from clients upon detecting overload. In
this thesis, we describe an early-discard mechanism that allows connection attempts from
clients to be dropped at any stage of the networking stack in response to queue drops,
without requiring additional user-space monitoring. Unfortunately, we do not have access
to a network card that can selectively drop packets. We do believe that our early-discard
mechanism can be used to drop packets directly on such an intelligent network card. Iyer
et al. also point out that it is currently unclear as to what protocol changes are required
in the implementation of TCP and HTTP to allow efficient overload control in Internet
servers. In this thesis, we explore this design space at the TCP connection establishment
and termination stages.
End-systems or (intermediate network nodes) can apply techniques such as Active
Queue Management (e.g., Random Early Drop) [33] or adaptive control [43] to imple-
ment admission control during TCP connection establishment. Some of the connection
establishment mechanisms proposed and studied in this thesis can provide better system
throughput and response time by explicitly notifying clients who are not admitted at an
overloaded server. These mechanisms can be used in conjunction with techniques that ac-
tually effect client admission. Voigt et al. [85] point out a common shortcoming in predictive
admission control techniques – it is difficult to arrive at optimal control parameters (e.g.,
load-shedding threshold) that do not under-utilize the server. In contrast to predictive
admission control, the mechanisms studied in this thesis rely on queue drops when SYN
or SYN/ACK ACK segments are received to implement admission control. That is, they
use the SYN and the listen queues in the networking stack to perform reactive admission
control only when the server is overloaded.
Mahajan et al. [56] introduced the notion of an aggregate to describe the network
congestion and high bandwidth utilization resulting from an increase in traffic due to
denial of service attacks and flash crowds. They focus on protecting the network from
congestion resulting from aggregates by proposing two mechanisms – a local aggregate
identification and rate-control algorithm, and a push back mechanism to allow a router
to request adjacent upstream routers to perform rate limiting on links responsible for the
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aggregate. In this thesis, we focus on alleviating end-system (server) load during flash
crowds. Our work complements efforts to protect network links during flash crowds. In
fact, some of the connection management mechanisms discussed in this thesis eliminate
the introduction of unnecessary packets into the network during flash crowds.
Jamjoom and Shin [45] describe a mechanism called persistent dropping designed to
reduce the client delay during a flash crowd. Persistent dropping randomly chooses a
portion of SYN segments received from the clients (based on a target reduction rate), and
systematically drops them on every retransmission. That is, under overload, a subset of new
client SYNs received are dropped with a non-zero probability and all retransmitted client
SYNs are always dropped. Persistent dropping relies on techniques to distinguish between
new and retransmitted SYN segments and requires the server TCP stack to either maintain
additional state information about clients14 or compromise on fairness by discriminating
against a fixed set of clients for a length of time. Persistent dropping can be deployed
by either routers or end-systems. While it does not seek to improve server (end-system)
throughput during flash crowds, persistent dropping does reduce the mean client response
times by up to 60%. In this thesis, we examine alternatives to persistent dropping, which
allow the server to prevent the retransmission of TCP connection establishment segments
by clients, without requiring any server-side state and forgoing fairness. We describe a
connection establishment mechanism that is not only as effective as persistent dropping in
reducing the client response time, it also improves the throughput of an overloaded server.
Jamjoom and Shin propose an ICMP extension called Reject message [44] to improve
a server’s ability to control the rate of incoming TCP connections. An ICMP Reject mes-
sage can be sent to clients whose SYN segments are dropped. It contains information to
notify a client to abort a connection attempt or to modify its next SYN retransmission
timeout. Jamjoom and Shin do not provide an evaluation of this mechanism, in particular,
its implication on the throughput and the response time of an overloaded server is unclear.
Additionally, before it can take effect, the Reject message extension requires modifications
to the ICMP implementation at client networking stacks. To our knowledge, the Reject
message extension is not deployed in any production networking stacks. In this thesis, we
14Note that storing client state for incoming SYN segments increases server vulnerability to SYN flood
denial of service attacks.
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study TCP connection establishment mechanisms that can be implemented on server TCP
stacks without requiring any extensions to existing Internet protocols, modifications to
currently deployed TCP stacks at the clients, or changes to client-side or server-side appli-
cations. We also provide a detailed evaluation of the impact of several different connection
establishment mechanisms, some of which allow the server to notify clients to abort their
connection attempts, on server throughput and client response times during overload. The
results presented in this thesis do make a strong case for developing a standard mechanism
at the client-side socket API to inform client applications of overload at the server (e.g.,
through an error code such as ESERVEROVRLD) upon receiving a notification from the server.
Solutions such as HTTP proxy caching often fail to alleviate load at the server during
flash crowds because of the geographical and organizational dispersion of clients [68] and
because current cache consistency mechanisms fail to significantly reduce the number of
requests that a web server has to handle during periods of extreme user interest [6]. Content
Distribution Networks (CDNs) like Akamai [3] provide the infrastructure to ensure good
performance and high availability during flash crowds15. However, most web sites have
enough capacity to handle their normal load and experience flash crowds infrequently. As
reported by Ari et al. [5], capacity added to handle flash crowds is more than 82% under-
utilized during normal loads, hence, over-provisioning is not a cost-effective solution. It is
also unlikely that all web sites can afford the services of a commercial CDN. This thesis
studies mechanisms to improve server throughput at such web sites during flash crowds.
Padmanabhan and Sripanidkulchai [68] propose Cooperative Networking (CoopNet), a
peer-to-peer caching solution, where end-hosts cooperate to improve performance perceived
by all. As with the pseudo-serving approach introduced by Kong and Ghosal [51], CoopNet
addresses flash crowds by utilizing clients that have already downloaded content, to serve
that content to other clients, thereby alleviating load at the server. This cooperation
among clients is invoked only for the duration of a flash crowd, and thus complements
the traditional client-server communication. Backslash [79] and Coral cache [35] refine the
peer-to-peer content distribution approach by using a distributed hash table overlay for
15Incidentally, in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, Akamai saw traffic jump 350%
above its normal load [25], suggesting that flash crowds can pose a threat to even well-provisioned distri-
bution networks.
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automatically replicating content of volunteer sites to alleviate load at the origin server.
While pseudo-serving and CoopNet require modifications to existing client applications,
Backslash and Coral leverage DNS redirection to work with existing web browsers. Note
that all of these peer-to-peer systems require web sites to participate before a flash crowd
occurs. Many web sites may not use peer-to-peer solutions for economic reasons (e.g.,
loss of ad revenue) or due to lack of awareness. Unauthorized mirroring of content may
constitute a breach of copyright and might inhibit the widespread deployment of these
solutions. In this thesis, we focus on trying to improve server throughput and response
time in the traditional client-server communication model that is currently pervasive in
the Internet. The connection management mechanisms discussed in this thesis can also
improve the performance of overloaded content distribution networks.
Both flash crowds and denial of service attacks are characterized by a large surge in
traffic and result in overload at the server. While flash crowds are caused by legitimate
clients, who seek “interesting” content at a web site, denial of service attacks are caused
by malicious attackers, and represent “an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legit-
imate users of a service from using that service” [21]. A server should handle as many
requests as possible during flash crowds, but need not handle requests originating from
denial of service attacks. Recent work has presented techniques to distinguish between
flash crowds and denial of service attacks. Jung et al. [47] study the characteristics of flash
crowds and denial of service attacks, and propose a network-aware clustering mechanism
to identify and drop packets (including TCP SYN segments) from IP addresses that are
likely to represent malicious clients. Kandula et al. [49] present a kernel extension called
Kill-Bots to protect servers from denial of service attacks that masquerade as flash crowds.
Kill-Bots uses graphical tests16 to identify and block IP addresses of the attack machines.
In addition to authentication, the Kill-Bots work also examines admission control in the
context of malicious clients. Although Kill-Bots modifies the TCP stack to avoid stor-
ing any connection state related to unauthenticated clients, the authentication procedure
is implemented after a TCP connection is established17. In this thesis, we demonstrate
16Graphical puzzles called CAPTCHAs are also used by free web mail providers for identifying human
users while creating accounts.
17 Note that two TCP connections need to be established for every new HTTP request from an unau-
thenticated legitimate client in Kill-Bots, thereby increasing the connection management overhead.
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that some implementation choices for TCP connection establishment can improve server
throughput during overload. While our evaluation focuses on flash crowds (i.e., legitimate
requests), the mechanisms examined can be used along with techniques such as network-
aware clustering or Kill-Bots for admission control, authentication, or for rejecting requests
from malicious clients during denial of service attacks.
In the next chapter, we describe the experimental environment and the methodology





In this chapter we describe the hardware and software environment, including the web
servers, used in our evaluation. We also discuss the workloads, the overload model, and




We use web (HTTP) servers to illustrate the impact that implementation choices for TCP
connection management can have on server throughput and response time under over-
load. Web servers form the front-end of many Internet applications and are likely to
bear the brunt of heavy traffic during flash crowds. Note that the results of the connec-
tion management mechanisms studied in this thesis can also apply to other TCP-based,
connection-oriented Internet servers which can get overloaded, such as LDAP servers.
We use two different web servers in our evaluation – the µserver, an event-driven,
user-space web server, and TUX, a kernel-space web server.
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The µserver
We use the µserver [52, 19] to represent current high-performance, user-space web servers.
The µserver is a single process event-driven web server designed to facilitate research on
the impact of operating system design and implementation on server performance and
scalability.
While the µserver can support multiple event notification mechanisms, in our experi-
ments we use the select() system call to obtain events from the operating system. We
also use the Accept-INF [19] option while accepting new connections. That is, whenever
select() indicates that an accept() call can complete without blocking, the µserver keeps
issuing accept() calls in a tight loop until one of them fails, thereby draining the listen
queue entirely. Recent work [19, 77, 37] has demonstrated that a select()-based µserver
using the Accept-INF option can withstand sustained overload and yield throughput that
rivals that provided by specialized, in-kernel web servers.
We use the µserver in our experiments because it provides better performance than
existing thread or process-per-connection, user-space web servers such as Apache. In fact,
our preliminary experiments showed that the throughput with Apache was more than five
times lower than that obtained with the µserver1. Apache uses multiple threads or pro-
cesses, each of which accepts a connection and processes it to completion before accepting
the next connection. We expect that the TCP connection management mechanisms stud-
ied in this thesis will have an even greater impact on the performance of servers like Apache
that are not as aggressive as the µserver in accepting new connections.
TUX
We use the in-kernel TUX [39, 55] web server (also called the Redhat Content Accelerator)
in some of our experiments. TUX has been reported to be the fastest web server on
Linux [46]. By running in the kernel, TUX eliminates the cost of event notification (or
scheduling), kernel boundary crossings, and redundant data buffering, which traditional
user-space servers incur. More importantly, TUX has direct access to kernel-level data
structures such as the server socket’s listen queue, and is closely integrated with the kernel’s
1We used the one-packet workload for this evaluation.
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networking stack and file system cache. This allows it to implement several optimizations
such as zero-copy request parsing, zero-copy disk reads, and zero-copy network writes.
Note that we use the Accept-1 [19] option added to TUX by Brecht et al. [19] in order to
maintain a balance between accepting new connections and completing work on existing
connections. In this configuration, TUX accepts a single connection from the listen queue
and works on it until it is completed or until it blocks. This is different than the default
approach of draining the listen queue completely and then working on all the accepted
connections. Pariag [72] and Brecht et al. [19] have demonstrated that with the Accept-
1 option, TUX can provide higher throughput and lower response time compared to its
default connection acceptance mechanism.
We use TUX in our experiments to demonstrate that implementation choices for TCP
connection management can have a significant impact on the performance of an over-
loaded server, even if the server has been streamlined and optimized to perform a single
task efficiently. In particular, we believe that some of the TCP connection establishment
mechanisms discussed in this thesis can be deployed in Layer 4 or 7 switches, which per-
form admission control for a web server farm, to improve their throughput and reduce client
response times during flash crowds. TUX provides an approximation of the potential ef-
fectiveness of these mechanisms in improving the throughput and reducing the response
time in such specialized switches.
Server Configuration
As described earlier, we use the select-based µserver (version 0.5.1-pre-03) with the
Accept-INF option. While we use the zero-copy sendfile() system call for the SPECweb99-
like workloads in the µserver, for the one-packet workload we use the writev() system
call to transmit data as well as HTTP headers from an application-level cache because
it results in better performance due to the absence of setsockopt() calls to cork and
uncork a socket [71, 66]. We use TUX (kernel module version 2) with a single thread,
as recommended in its users manual [39], enhanced with the Accept-1 option as described
earlier.
Both the µserver and TUX are configured to use a maximum of 15,000 simultaneous
connections, however, we never reach this maximum limit. Logging is disabled on both the
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servers to prevent disk writes from confounding our results. Note that in this thesis we
focus on using the µserver and TUX to evaluate several different implementation choices
for TCP connection management. Unlike earlier work [19, 72, 77], we do not seek to present
a direct comparison between the two web servers.
SYN and Listen Queue Sizes
The size of the SYN queue can be configured through the net.ipv4.tcp max syn backlog
sysctl (a sysctl is an administrator-configurable parameter in Linux). Its default size is
1024 for systems with more than 256 MB of memory, 128 for those systems with less
than 32 MB of memory, and 256 otherwise. The size of the listen queue is determined by
the value specified for the “backlog” parameter to the listen system call. Historically,
Internet servers have used a backlog value between 5 and 8 [80]. Recent TCP stacks allow
applications to use a larger backlog value to buffer more connections between accept()
calls. The Linux 2.4 TCP stack silently limits the backlog value specified by the application
to 128. The Linux 2.6 stack allows this maximum backlog value to be modified through
the net.core.somaxconn sysctl, but continues to use a default maximum backlog of 128.
Thus, the de facto listen queue size in Linux TCP stacks is at most 1282. The listen queue
size for the in-kernel TUX web server can be set through the net.tux.max backlog sysctl,
which defaults to 2048.
For our experiments, we use the default values for the SYN queue (1024) and the listen
queue (128 for µserver, 2048 for TUX) because of the large number of existing production
systems that operate with these limits. While it is possible that using different values
for these queues might influence server throughput during short bursts of high load, for
the persistent overload scenarios (such as flash crowds) that we study in this thesis, it is
sufficient to note that these queues are of a fixed size and will overflow during sustained
periods of high load. Note that Arlitt and Williamson have reported that the size of the
listen queue does not have a significant impact on server performance under high load [7].
We also conducted some preliminary experiments under persistent overload with different
queue sizes and found no qualitative differences in server throughput obtained with the
different connection establishment mechanisms studied in this thesis. As expected from
2Unless configured otherwise.
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queueing theory, using a larger queue does increase the average client response time.
3.1.2 Machine and Network Setup
All experiments are conducted in an environment consisting of eight client machines and
one server machine. We use a 32-bit, 2-way 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon (x86) server in most of
our experiments. This machine contains 8 KB of L1 cache, 512 KB of L2 cache, 1 GB
of RAM, and two Intel e1000 gigabit Ethernet cards. The client machines are identical
to the server, and are connected to it through a full-duplex, gigabit Ethernet switch. We
partition the clients into two different subnets to communicate with the server on different
network cards. That is, the first four clients are linked to the server’s first network card,
while the remaining four clients communicate with the server using a different subnet on
its second network card. In this thesis, we focus on evaluating server performance under
the assumption that the upstream and downstream bandwidth of the server’s network link
is not the bottleneck during overload. Hence, we have configured our experimental setup
to ensure that the network bandwidth is not the bottleneck in any of our experiments.
Our server runs a custom Linux 2.4.22 kernel in uni-processor mode. This kernel is
a vanilla 2.4.22 kernel with its TCP stack modified to support the different connection
establishment and termination mechanisms studied in this thesis. We use a 2.4 Linux
kernel because of difficulties (i.e., kernel panics and server bugs) running TUX with the
newer 2.6 kernel. Note that the TCP connection management code that we are concerned
with in this thesis has not changed between the 2.4.22 kernel and the latest 2.6 kernel
(2.6.11.6). The results of the different connection management mechanisms on a 2.6 kernel
will be qualitatively similar to those presented in this thesis. To demonstrate this, we
show some experimental results using a 2.6.11 kernel in Section 5.5. All of our clients run
a Redhat 9.0 distribution with its 2.4.20-8 Linux kernel.
For our experiments in Section 5.5, we use an HP rx2600 server with a different processor
architecture – a 64-bit, 2-way 900 MHz Itanium 2 (ia-64). This machine has 32 KB of L1
cache, 256 KB of L2 cache, 1.5 MB of L3 cache, 4 GB of RAM, and two Intel e1000
gigabit Ethernet cards. The rest of the client and network setup used for the Itanium 2
experiments remains unchanged.
We do not modify the default values for other networking-related kernel parameters
34
such as send and receive socket buffer sizes, TCP maximum retransmission limits, trans-
mit queue lengths, or driver-specific parameters on our servers (or our clients). A large
number of production server machines run “out of the box” without modifying the default
configuration. Running our experiments in the same fashion increases the applicability of
our results. More importantly, changing the default values (without having a good rea-
son to do so) unnecessarily increases the parameter space that must be explored in the
experiments.
We have instrumented the TCP stack in our server kernels to report detailed statis-
tics during connection establishment and termination. The Linux kernel only tracks the
number of failed connection attempts (total queue drops), and the number of listen queue
overflows (ListenQOverflow-induced queue drops). We added fine-grained counters to track
all the causes of queue drops, including those due to SynQ3/4Full and ListenQFullAtSyn3.
Although these counters are not tracked by the Linux kernel by default, the overhead added
by our additions is minimal. These detailed statistics are available through the standard
kernel SNMP interface and can be obtained through programs such as netstat.
3.2 Workloads and Overload Model
We use two different workloads to evaluate the impact of TCP connection management
mechanisms on server performance. Note that both of our workloads involve requests for
static files that can be served completely from the in-memory file system cache. During
a flash crowd, clients are typically interested in a very small subset of a web site [25, 87],
which is cached by the file system after the first few requests. To alleviate server load during
flash crowds, web administrators often replace pages that require the generation of dynamic
content with static pages [25, 68]. Our first workload is inspired by a real-world flash crowd,
while our second workload is based on the popular SPECweb99 benchmark [26]. In this
section, in addition to discussing both these workloads in detail, we will also describe our
workload generator (which is able to generate overload conditions at the server using a few
client machines), and our overload model.
3All rules that cause queue drops are described in Section 2.1.1
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3.2.1 One-packet Workload
Our first workload is motivated by real-world flash crowd events [25, 68]. Media sites
such as CNN.com and MSNBC were subjected to crippling overload immediately after the
September 11th terrorist attacks [25], pushing site availability down to 0% and response
time to over 47 seconds [38]. The staff at CNN.com responded by replacing their main
page with a small, text-only page, sized to allow the server reply (including the headers)
to fit into a single unfragmented IP packet. We devised our one-packet workload to mimic
the load experienced by CNN.com on September 11th. Each client requests the same one-
packet file using an HTTP 1.1 connection. Note that every client connection consists of a
single request.
We believe that the one-packet workload also highlights other aspects of load ex-
perienced by real-world web servers that are typically ignored by benchmarks such as
SPECweb99. Nahum [65] compares the characteristics of SPECweb99 with data traces
gathered from several real-world web server logs. His analysis points out some important
shortcomings of the SPECweb99 benchmark. In particular, SPECweb99 does not take into
account conditional GET requests, it underestimates the number of HTTP 1.0 requests,
and overestimates the average file transfer size.
A conditional GET request contains an “If-Modified-Since” header. If the requested
file has not been modified since the value specified in the header, the server returns an
HTTP 304 Not Modified header with zero bytes of (file) data. This response can easily
fit into a single IP packet. Nahum reports that up to 28% of all requests in some server
traces consist of single packet transfers due to conditional GET requests. He also reports
that the proportion of HTTP 1.0 connections used in SPECweb99, namely, 30%, is much
smaller than that seen in his traces. HTTP 1.1, standardized in 1997, added support for
persistent connections, where multiple requests can be made over a single TCP connection.
However, even in some of Nahum’s traces obtained in 2000 and 2001, up to 50% of the
requests originated from a HTTP 1.0 connection. Finally, the median transfer size in these
traces is much smaller than that used in SPECweb99 and is small enough to fit in a single
IP packet.
Thus, our one-packet workload is derived from measures taken by CNN.com to address
a flash crowd. Having the server deliver a single small file from its file system cache is
36
perhaps the best way to serve the most clients under extreme overload. It also incorporates
a number of characteristics reported by Nahum in real-world web traces, which are ignored
by popular web benchmarks. Past work characterizing flash crowds [47] has reported that
the increase in server traffic occurs largely because of an increase in the number of clients,
which causes the number of TCP connections that a server has to handle to escalate.
The connection-oriented nature of the one-packet workload, which arises from using a
single request per HTTP connection, stresses the server’s networking subsystem, thereby
highlighting the impact of the implementation choices for TCP connection management.
3.2.2 SPECweb99-like Workload
The SPECweb99 benchmark [26] has become the de facto standard for evaluating web
server performance [65]. Developed by the Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation
(SPEC), its workload model is based on server logs taken from several popular Internet
servers and some smaller web sites. The benchmark provides a workload generator that can
generate static as well as dynamic requests. The later constitute 30% of all requests [27].
As described in Section 3.2.1, during flash crowds, web servers have to handle primarily
a static, in-memory workload. To ensure that our workload remains representative of real-
world overload scenarios, we carefully constructed an HTTP trace that mimics the static
portion of the SPECweb99 workload. We use one directory4 from the SPECweb99 file set,
which contains 36 files and occupies 4.8 MB. The entire file set can be easily cached and
no disk I/O is required once the cache has been populated. Our trace contains HTTP 1.1
connections with one or more requests per connection, where each connection represents an
HTTP session. The trace recreates the file classes and the Zipf-distribution access patterns
that are required by the SPECweb99 specifications. We refer to the resulting workload as
SPECweb99-like.
30% of connections used in SPECweb99 are HTTP 1.0, and the number of requests
per connection for the remaining 70% of HTTP 1.1 connections range from 5 to 15, with
an average of 7.2. As described in Section 2.2.2, many popular web browsers use parallel
connections for their requests in order to improve client throughput and minimize the
4Note that all directories in the SPECweb99 file set are identical with respect to the structure and sizes
of their files.
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response time. This is in contrast to using a single sequential persistent connection to
fetch embedded objects modelled in SPECweb99. Jamjoom and Shin [45] report that the
average number of requests per connection issued in current browsers is between 1.2 and
2.7. In particular, Internet Explorer, by far the most popular web browser today [8], uses
an average of 2.7 requests per connection. This is significantly lower than the average of
7.2 requests per connection used in SPECweb99.
Thus, SPECweb99 underestimates the rate of new connection attempts seen at busy
web servers. To address this problem, we use three different values for average requests
per connection with our SPECweb99-like workload, namely, 1.0, 2.625, and 7.2. That is,
we use three different SPECweb99-like workloads each of which follow the file classes and
access patterns specified in SPECweb99, but use sessions that on average have a single
request per connection, 2.62 requests per connection and 7.2 requests per connection. Like
the one-packet workload, the single-request-per-connection SPECweb99-like workload is
connection-oriented, and can be seen as an extension of the one-packet workload that uses
different file sizes in its requests. The mean size of files requested in all of our SPECweb99-
like workloads is around 15 KB. The 2.62-requests-per-connection SPECweb99-like work-
load seeks to be representative of the behaviour of current web browsers, while the 7.2-
requests-per-connection SPECweb99-like workload meets most6 of the SPECweb99 speci-
fications for static content.
We use the one-packet workload for most of our experiments in Chapters 4 and 5
because its connection-oriented nature highlights the performance impact of the different
TCP connection management mechanisms. We also believe that it is more representative
of the loads handled by web servers during flash crowds, where most of the clients are
interested in a single “hot” page (e.g., a breaking news story or a live game score), and
the server administrators have taken steps to ensure that all the “hot” content is delivered
as quickly and efficiently as possible. We examine the impact of the SPECweb99-like
workloads on the implementation choices for TCP connection management in Section 5.1.
5With our SPECweb99-like trace generator, an average of 2.62 requests per connection was the closest
that we could come to the average of 2.7 requests per connection used in Internet Explorer.
6We use HTTP 1.1 for connections consisting of a single request instead of HTTP 1.0 as specified in
SPECweb99 in order to ensure that all connection terminations are initiated by the clients.
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3.2.3 Workload Generator
The workload generator provided with the SPECweb99 benchmark operates in a closed
loop. That is, each client modelled in the generator will only send a new request once the
server has replied to its previous request. Banga and Druschel [11] demonstrate that such
a naive load generation scheme allows the rate of requests made by the generator to be
throttled by the server. Even though more than one client can be run on a machine, many
such clients that are blocked waiting for a response from the server can cause that machine
to run out of resources such as available ephemeral TCP ports or file descriptors. Without
resources at the client machine, additional connections cannot be attempted, hence, a
closed-loop workload generator is unable to maintain sustained load that can exceed the
capacity of the server. While it is possible to use a large number of client machines to
create overload conditions, Banga and Druschel show that several thousand closed-loop
generators (and hence client machines) would be needed to generate sustained overload.
We address the inability of the SPECweb99 generator to produce overload at the
server by using httperf [64], an open-loop workload generator in conjunction with our
SPECweb99-like traces. Open-loop generators such as httperf induce overload by imple-
menting connection timeouts. Every time a connection to the server is attempted a timer
is started. If the timer expires before a connection can be established, the connection
is aborted so that a new one can be attempted in its place. If the connection does get
established, the timer is restarted for every request issued and the connection is closed on
a timeout. A connection is deemed successful if all of its requests are served without a
timeout. By using an application-level timeout, httperf is able to bound the resources
required by a client. This ensures that the server receives a continuous rate of requests
which is independent of its reply rate. The timeout used in httperf is similar to the be-
haviour of some web users (or even browsers) who give up on a connection if they do not
receive a response from the server within a reasonable amount of time.
By running in an event-driven fashion, only a single copy of httperf is needed per
client CPU to generate sustained overload. In addition to the throughput and response
time statistics for successful clients, httperf tracks the number of timed out and server-
aborted7 connections as errors. While it is possible that there are other causes for errors
7Connections for which a RST is received from the server, either prior to or after connection establish-
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measured at the client (e.g., running out of ephemeral ports) we have carefully monitored
our tests to ensure that all httperf errors are due to timeouts or connections aborted by
the server.
We use a 10 second timeout in all of our experiments. With our Linux clients, this allows
a SYN segment to be retransmitted at most twice when no response is received from the
server, before a connection is aborted by the client. A 10 second timeout is chosen as an
approximation of how long a user might be willing to wait, but more importantly it allows
our clients to mimic the behaviour of TCP stacks in Windows 2000 and XP8, which also
retransmit a SYN at most twice. We examine the impact of using different timeouts in
Section 5.3.
3.2.4 Overload Model
We use a persistent overload9 model that simulates flash crowds in our evaluation of dif-
ferent connection management mechanisms. Under persistent overload, a server has to
try to handle loads well in excess of its capacity for an extended period of time. That is,
the duration of sustained overload at the server is much longer than that of any interim
periods of light load. In contrast, a bursty traffic model assumes that overload conditions
are transient, with short-lived bursts of heavy traffic (overload bursts) interrupting pro-
tracted periods of light load at the server. Figure 3.1 illustrates the difference between
these overload models.
Our persistent overload model assumes that a server has to handle sustained overload
for a length of time measured in minutes or hours. This is not an unreasonable assumption –
past flash crowds have reported prolonged periods of overload at the server, which last for
many hours, sometimes even for a day [25, 68, 87, 47]. Accordingly, flash crowd simulation
models [5] often assume a rapid spike in load at the server at the beginning of the flash
crowd, a continuous stream of incoming requests that saturate the server for a protracted
period, followed by a sudden drop in load that marks the end of the flash crowd.
Persistent overload does not imply that there is only a single long-lasting period of
ment.
8The TCP implementation used by a majority of web clients today [8].
9The term “persistent overload” is due to Mahajan et al. [56].
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(a) Persistent Overload (b) Bursty Traffic
Figure 3.1: Comparison of Overload Models
overload at the server. It is possible to have multiple periods of overload – similar to the
multiple shock waves model described by Ari et al. [5] – as long as their duration is much
longer than the duration of the interim periods of light load. Note that persistent overload
represents flash crowds, it does not imply that the server is perpetually under overload.
An “always-overloaded” web site indicates that it is time for the administrators to upgrade
server capacity. Our persistent overload model applies to those web sites which normally
have enough capacity to handle the load received, but end up operating near or past their
saturation point due to a temporary surge in the popularity of the content that they are
serving.
The overload model can influence the results of some TCP connection establishment
mechanisms. Consider a mechanism which notifies client TCP stacks to stop the retrans-
mission of connection attempts whenever queue drops occur. Such a mechanism can lead
to poor aggregate server throughput if the duration of overload is short compared to the
duration of light load because most of the client retransmissions might be serviced during
the periods of light load10. On the other hand, as we will demonstrate in this thesis, if over-
load conditions last long enough so that most of the client TCP retransmission attempts
occur while the server is still under overload, such a mechanism can actually increase server
throughput. Note the distinction between retransmissions at the TCP layer and the ap-
plication layer. The former are due to the semantics of TCP, where segments that are not
10Note however, that as discussed in Section 5.2, it might be possible to avoid queue drops during short
bursts altogether by sizing the SYN and listen queues appropriately.
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acknowledged by the peer are retransmitted. Higher layer protocols are not aware of these
retransmissions. Application-level retries are specifically initiated by the client-side appli-
cation or by the end user. As described in Section 3.3, we treat application-level retries in
the same way as new connection establishment attempts.
Thus, we use the persistent overload model in most of our experiments because it
is representative of the load handled by servers during flash crowds. Note that unless
otherwise qualified, we use the term “overload” to mean persistent overload. In Section 5.2,
we discuss the impact of bursty traffic on server performance with different connection
establishment mechanisms.
3.3 Methodology
In each of our experiments we evaluate server performance with a particular connection
establishment and/or termination mechanism. An experiment consists of a series of data
points, where each data point corresponds to a particular request rate. For each data point,
we run httperf for two minutes, during which it generates requests on a steady basis at
the specified rate. The actual rate achieved by httperf depends on how quickly it can
recycle resources such as ports and file descriptors to generate new requests. While we
always report the target request rate (denoted requests/sec) specified to httperf in our
evaluation, at very high loads there can be a slight (less than 5%) difference in the target
rate and the request rate actually achieved by httperf, especially for those connection
establishment mechanisms that require a large number of connection attempts to be active
for the duration of the timeout (e.g., default). For the one-packet (as well as the single
request-per-connection SPECweb99-like) workload, the request rate equals the rate of new
connection attempts.
Note that httperf does not enforce application-level retries directly. The load gener-
ation model in httperf assumes that no immediate application-level retries are initiated
upon a connection failure, either on an explicit notification from the server or on a (applica-
tion) timeout. This assumption ensures that the rate of requests generated is independent
of the connection establishment mechanism used at the server. We account for application-
level retries (e.g., those inititated by a user hitting the “Reload” button in a web browser)
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by using a higher request rate. That is, the requests generated at a particular rate rep-
resent not only maiden requests from new clients, but also retried attempts from those
clients that did not get a response for their initial request.
Two minutes provide sufficient time for the server to achieve steady state execution.
We have observed that running a data point for longer than two minutes did not alter
the measured results, but only prolonged the duration of the experiment. We use a two
minute idle period between consecutive data points, which allows TCP sockets to clear
the TIME WAIT state before the next data point is run. Before running an experiment,
all non-essential services and daemons such as cron and sendmail are terminated on the
server. We also ensure that we have exclusive access to the client and server machines as
well as the network during the experiments to prevent external factors from confounding
the results.
We primarily use the following metrics in our evaluation of server performance.
1. Server throughput (replies/sec) – the mean number of replies per second delivered
by the server, measured at the clients.
2. Client response time – the mean response time measured at the clients for successful
connections. It includes the connection establishment time as well as the data transfer
time.
Additionally, we use the following metrics to support our analysis of throughput and
response time results.
1. Queue drop rate (qdrops/sec) – the number of connection establishment attempts
that are dropped at the server TCP stack, reported on a per-second basis.
2. Error rate (errors/sec) – the number of failed (i.e., aborted by the server or timed
out by the client application) connections, reported on a per-second basis.
For our primary metrics, server throughput and client response time, we compute and
report the 95% confidence intervals based on the statistics provided by httperf. We do not
compute confidence intervals for our supporting metrics, the error and queue drop rates,
which are simple counts obtained for each request rate. Obtaining the confidence intervals
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for these metrics would require each experiment to be run multiple times, this significantly
increases the duration of our evaluation but does not insure additional insight. Note that
for workloads using a single request per connection (e.g., the one-packet workload), the sum
of the server throughput (reply rate) and the error rate equals the request rate achieved
by httperf.
The results of each experiment are depicted on a graph where the x-axis represents
the request rate and the y-axis displays one of the performance metrics. While discussing
the results of our experiments, we focus our attention on server behaviour after it has
reached its peak capacity (i.e., the saturation point). All of the connection management
mechanisms discussed in this thesis come into play only when the server is overloaded, in
particular, only when queue drops occur at the server. They do not affect server throughput
or client response times during periods of light load.
In the next chapter, we study the impact of TCP connection establishment and ter-




Impact of TCP Connection
Management on Overload Server
Performance
In this chapter, we show that implementation choices for TCP connection management,
in particular TCP connection establishment and TCP connection termination, can have
a significant impact on an overloaded server’s throughput and response time. Figure 4.1
outlines the road map of the different connection management mechanisms investigated
in this chapter1. In Section 4.1, we point out the shortcomings in the existing connection
establishment mechanism implemented in Linux (as well as some UNIX TCP stacks), dis-
cuss alternative solutions, and evaluate them. The connection establishment mechanisms
studied can be categorized based on the stage at which they operate in the three-way
handshake. We examine two alternatives at the SYN stage and two alternatives at the
ACK stage, as shown in Figure 4.1.
We also evaluate two alternative connection termination mechanisms in Section 4.2.
We present a connection termination mechanism that allows us to assess the cost of sup-
porting half-closed TCP connections. We also evaluate the impact of an abortive release
of connections by clients on server throughput. Note that some of these connection estab-






















Figure 4.1: Road map of TCP connection management mechanisms investigated in this
chapter
lishment as well as termination mechanisms can be used together. In particular, different
mechanisms (leaf nodes) that do not have a common parent in the tree shown in Figure 4.1
can be combined together. As explained in Section 3.2, we generate overload using the
one-packet workload with a 10 second timeout for all of our experiments in this chapter.
4.1 Impact of TCP Connection Establishment
on Server Performance
In the following sections, we describe the shortcomings in the Linux server TCP stack when
queue drops occur while processing client connection establishment attempts, and review
alternative implementation choices. Some of these alternative mechanisms are already
implemented in UNIX or Windows TCP stacks, while some of them are novel. All of these
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implementation choices affect only the server TCP stack – no protocol changes to TCP, or
modifications to the client TCP stacks and applications, or server applications are required.
We refer to the existing connection establishment mechanism in Linux as default. As
explained in Section 2.1.1, under overload, queue drops can occur in the Linux TCP stack
when the server receives a SYN and either the SynQ3/4Full or the ListenQFullAtSyn rule
is triggered, or when the ListenQOverflow rule is triggered upon receiving a SYN/ACK
ACK. As indicated earlier, we divide our discussion into problems arising from queue drops
occurring at the ACK stage and those occurring at the SYN stage.
4.1.1 Problem – Listen Queue Overflow upon Receiving
SYN/ACK ACKs
As shown in Figure 2.1, the Linux TCP stack does not respond with a SYN/ACK to a
SYN when the listen queue is full. This prevents the client from immediately sending a
SYN/ACK ACK while the listen queue is still likely to be full and thus reduces the number
of queue drops due to ListenQOverflow.
However, while responding to a SYN, the TCP stack code only checks if the listen
queue is completely full. It is possible that the number of SYN/ACKs sent by the server
at a given point in time exceeds the amount of free space available in the listen queue.
Consider a listen queue of size 128, which is entirely empty. The TCP stack then receives
1000 SYNs. Since the listen queue is not full, it sends back 1000 SYN/ACKs. If the round-
trip time (RTT) to each client is roughly the same, the server TCP stack will receive 1000
SYN/ACK ACKs around the same time. This is a problem because only 128 SYN/ACK
ACKs can be accommodated in the listen queue, the rest trigger the ListenQOverflow rule.
The Linux TCP stack silently drops a SYN/ACK ACK that triggers ListenQOverflow.
No notification is sent to the client and the client’s incomplete connection continues to
occupy space in the SYN queue. Under overload, we have observed that the server ap-
plication’s listen queue is nearly always full because the rate of new connections exceeds
the rate at which the application is able to accept them. The TCP stack receives a burst
of SYNs and responds to all of them with SYN/ACKs, as long as there is space for at
least one entry in the listen queue (and the SYN queue is not three-quarters full). This
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invariably results in the server receiving more SYN/ACK ACKs than there is space for in
the listen queue, leading to a high number of queue drops due to ListenQOverflow.
It is instructive to study the effect of a silent SYN/ACK ACK drop at the server on the
client. Figure 4.2 provides tcpdump [42] output to illustrate the flow of TCP segments from
a client (s01) whose SYN/ACK ACK triggered ListenQOverflow at the server (suzuka).
In our tcpdump output we only display the time at which TCP segments were received or
transmitted at the server, the end-point identifiers, the TCP flags field (i.e., SYN (S), PSH
(P), or FIN (F)), the ACK field, the relative sequence and acknowledgement numbers, and
the advertised window sizes.
Upon receiving a SYN/ACK, the client TCP stack sends a SYN/ACK ACK, transitions
the connection to the ESTABLISHED state, and returns the connect() call signifying a
successful connection. The client application is now free to start transmitting data on
that connection, and therefore sends an 80-byte HTTP request to the server (line 4).
However, the client’s SYN/ACK ACK (line 3) has been silently dropped by the server due
to ListenQOverflow.
From the server’s point of view, the connection is still in SYN RECV state awaiting a
SYN/ACK ACK, hence, all subsequent client TCP segments (except RSTs) are handled in
the SYN RECV code path. Even subsequent data (PSH2) and termination notification (FIN)
segments from the client are handled in the code path for connections in the SYN RECV
state. The data and FIN segments, which are treated as an implied SYN/ACK ACK, can
result in additional queue drops if the listen queue is full when they arrive at the server.
Thus there is a disconnect between TCP connection state at the client (ESTABLISHED)
and the server (SYN RECV). The client keeps retransmitting the first segment of its re-
quest (lines 5, 6). Note that a typical HTTP request fits within a single TCP segment.
The retransmission timeout (RTO) used by the client for data requests tends to be more
aggressive than the exponential-backoff style retransmission timeout used for SYN retrans-
missions because the client has an estimate of the round-trip time (RTT) after receiving
the SYN/ACK. Eventually, the client-side application times out (after one second in the
example in Figure 4.2) and terminates the connection (line 7). Unfortunately, the FIN
segment also triggers ListenQOverflow at the server, so it has to be retransmitted (lines 8,
2A PSH segment usually corresponds to an application write in BSD-derived TCP stacks [80].
48
(1) 11:32:03.688005 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: S 1427884078:1427884078(0) win 5840
(2) 11:32:03.688026 suzuka.55000 > s01.1024: S 956286498:956286498(0)
ack 1427884079 win 5792
(3) 11:32:03.688254 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: . ack 1 win 5840
(4) 11:32:03.688254 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: P 1:81(80) ack 1 win 5840
(5) 11:32:03.892148 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: P 1:81(80) ack 1 win 5840
(6) 11:32:04.312178 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: P 1:81(80) ack 1 win 5840
(7) 11:32:04.688606 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: F 81:81(0) ack 1 win 5840
(8) 11:32:05.152238 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: FP 1:81(80) ack 1 win 5840
(9) 11:32:06.832233 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: FP 1:81(80) ack 1 win 5840
(10) 11:32:07.686446 suzuka.55000 > s01.1024: S 956286498:956286498(0)
ack 1427884079 win 5792
(11) 11:32:07.686533 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: . ack 1 win 5840
(FreeBSD clients do not send this extra ACK, instead sending
the FIN directly)
(12) 11:32:10.192219 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: FP 1:81(80) ack 1 win 5840
(13) 11:32:13.685533 suzuka.55000 > s01.1024: S 956286498:956286498(0)
ack 1427884079 win 5792
(14) 11:32:13.685637 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: . ack 1 win 5840
(15) 11:32:16.912070 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: FP 1:81(80) ack 1 win 5840
(16) 11:32:25.683711 suzuka.55000 > s01.1024: S 956286498:956286498(0)
ack 1427884079 win 5792
(17) 11:32:25.683969 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: . ack 1 win 5840
(18) 11:32:30.352020 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: FP 1:81(80) ack 1 win 5840
(The following TCP sequence occurs only if the server is able
to promote the incomplete connection to the listen queue)
(19) 11:32:30.352122 suzuka.55000 > s01.1024: P 1:1013(1012) ack 82 win 46
(20) 11:32:30.352142 suzuka.55000 > s01.1024: F 1013:1013(0) ack 82 win 46
(21) 11:32:30.352394 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: R 1427884160:1427884160(0) win 0
(22) 11:32:30.352396 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: R 1427884160:1427884160(0) win 0
Figure 4.2: tcpdump output of a client whose SYN/ACK ACK is silently dropped due to
ListenQOverflow while establishing a connection
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9, 12, 15, and 18).
If the server is unable to accommodate any subsequent client segments in its listen
queue, its SYN/ACK retransmission timeout expires, and it resends the SYN/ACK (lines
10, 13, and 16). There are some obvious problems with this SYN/ACK retransmission. In
the existing Linux implementation, a SYN/ACK is retransmitted even if the listen queue
is full. This can easily cause subsequent client responses to be dropped if the listen queue
continues to be full (lines 11, 12, 14, and 15), resulting in unnecessary network traffic. By
retransmitting the SYN/ACK, the server TCP stack also creates additional load for itself,
which is imprudent during overload. More importantly, the incomplete client connection
continues to occupy space in the SYN queue (to allow SYN/ACK retransmissions) as long
as a segment from that client cannot trigger a new entry to be added to the listen queue.
This reduces the amount of free space in the SYN queue and might cause subsequent SYNs
to be dropped due to the SynQ3/4Full rule.
If the listen queue is not full when a subsequent client segment arrives, the server TCP
stack creates a socket and places it on the listen queue. The server application can then
accept, read, process, and respond to the client request (lines 19 and 20). However, the
client application might have already closed its end of the connection, and hence the client
TCP stack might not care about responses on that connection from the server. As a result,
it sends a reset (RST) in response to every server reply (lines 21 and 22).
A subtle side-effect of handling all client segments subsequent to a SYN/ACK ACK drop
in the SYN RECV code path is an inflation (or over-counting) of queue drops measured at the
server. The count of ListenQOverflow-induced queue drops can be higher than expected
and can exceed the total number of new connections attempted by the client. Table 4.1
shows a breakdown of all queue drops due to ListenQOverflow (“Total ListenQOverflow-
Induced Qdrops”) counted by the server TCP stack for the one-packet workload with the
µserver at different request rates. Recall that we did not add this statistic, it is tracked and
reported by the vanilla Linux kernel. The “SYN/ACK ACKS Dropped” column indicates
the number of SYN/ACK ACKs dropped and the “Other Segments Dropped” column
indicates the number of all other segments (i.e., data and FIN) dropped in the SYN RECV
state code path. We have instrumented these two counters to obtain a fine-grained count










20,000 62,084 72,235 134,319
26,000 171,641 181,867 353,508
32,000 165,935 167,620 333,555
Table 4.1: Breakdown demonstrating inflation of ListenQOverflow-induced queue drops
reported by server TCP stack due to silent drop of SYN/ACK ACKs
connection attempts, the server TCP stack inflates the number of queue drops due to
ListenQOverflow, and hence, the number of failed connection attempts by a factor of two.
That is, while we expect the number of ListenQOverflow-induced queue drops to reflect
only the number of SYN/ACK ACKs dropped, this count in the kernel is inflated because
subsequent client segments are handled by the same SYN RECV state code path. The inflated
ListenQOverflow-induced queue drop count skews the total number of queue drops in all
the results with default reported in this thesis.
To summarize, the default mechanism to handle queue drops arising from ListenQOver-
flow in the Linux TCP stack (default) is problematic because:
1. It can result in a disconnect between the TCP states at the client and the server.
2. It can result in unnecessary TCP traffic (i.e., the transmission of data and FIN
segments following a silent SYN/ACK ACK drop) at the server as well as in the
network.
4.1.2 Solutions for the Listen Queue Overflow Problem
The disconnect between the TCP states at the end-points resulting from queue drops due to
ListenQOverflow and the subsequent redundant TCP traffic can be avoided in two different
ways – reactively, or by proactively preventing the listen queue from overflowing.
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Reactive Solutions
Instead of silently dropping a SYN/ACK ACK when ListenQOverflow is triggered, the
server TCP stack can send a reset (RST) to a client to notify it of its inability to continue
with the connection. A RST ensures that both end-points throw away all information as-
sociated with that connection and subsequently there is no TCP traffic on that connection.
The implicit assumption in aborting a connection on queue drops due to ListenQOverflow
is that the server application is not able to drain the listen queue fast enough to keep up
with the rate of incoming SYN/ACK ACKs. We will refer to this mechanism as abort3.
Unfortunately, any RST sent after a SYN/ACK is not transparent to the client appli-
cation. The application will be notified of a reset connection by the client TCP stack on
its next system call on that socket, which will fail with an error such as ECONNRESET. Thus,
abort results in the client getting a false impression of an established connection, which is
then immediately aborted by the server. Recall that without abort, when ListenQOver-
flow is triggered, the client has an impression that a connection has been established, when
it is in fact in SYN RECV state at the server.
By default, abort is used when a SYN/ACK ACK is dropped in TCP stacks in
FreeBSD, HP-UX 11, Solaris 2.7 and Windows [45]. Although it is not enabled by de-
fault, administrators on Linux can achieve similar behaviour by setting the net.ipv4.-
tcp abort on overflow sysctl.
Jamjoom and Shin [45] describe another reactive mechanism to handle queue drops
arising from ListenQOverflow. Whenever a SYN/ACK ACK triggers ListenQOverflow,
the TCP stack can temporarily grow the listen queue to accommodate it, but continue to
drop SYN segments by enforcing the ListenQFullAtSyn rule. Growing the listen queue to
accommodate the additional SYN/ACK ACK allows the server to transition the associated
connection to the ESTABLISHED TCP state. Note that no resizing of kernel data structures is
required because the listen queue is implemented as a linked list. However, this mechanism
disregards the listen queue size specified by the application, thereby overriding any listen
queue based admission control policies. The additional connections in the listen queue also
deplete the available kernel memory. Under overload, the server might not be able to accept
and process these connections before the client times out, resulting in an inappropriate use
3An abbreviation of the abort on overflow sysctl that achieves this behaviour in Linux.
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of resources. For these reasons, in this thesis, we do not consider growing the listen queue
to address queue drops due to ListenQOverflow.
Proactive Solutions
Proactive approaches that avoid queue drops due to ListenQOverflow ensure that the listen
queue is never full when a SYN/ACK ACK arrives. We are aware of one such proactive
approach, namely, lazy accept() [80]. We also describe a new proactive approach, which
implements listen queue reservation.
Lazy accept()
In the lazy accept() approach, the server TCP stack does not send a SYN/ACK in
response to a SYN until the server application issues an accept() system call. This
ensures that the server TCP stack can always accommodate a subsequent SYN/ACK ACK
in the listen queue. In fact, there is no reason to use separate SYN and listen queues to
implement lazy accept(). The server TCP stack can track information about connections
on which a SYN is received in a single queue until there is an accept() system call from
the application. It can subsequently complete the three-way handshake for the entry at the
head of that queue and make its associated socket descriptor available to the application4.
Such a scheme provides the server application with fine-grained admission control func-
tionality because the TCP stack does not complete the three-way handshake before the
application notifies it to do so. This is in contrast with most current TCP stack and socket
API implementations, in which a server application has to reject a connection that has
already been established by its TCP stack in order to effect admission control.
The Solaris 2.2 TCP stack provided a tcp eager listeners parameter to achieve the
lazy accept() behaviour [80]. Support for this parameter seems to have been discontin-
ued in later Solaris versions. The Windows Sockets API (Version 2) provides this func-
tionality through the SO CONDITIONAL ACCEPT socket option which can be used with the
WSAAccept() system call [58].
4Unfortunately, none of the open-source TCP stacks support lazy accept(), hence, we are unable to
verify its implementation details.
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Note that a lazy accept() approach can result in poor performance because the appli-
cation thread will invariably block waiting for the three-way handshake to be completed by
the TCP stack. While the server TCP stack can return an EWOULDBLOCK error for sockets
in non-blocking mode if there is no pending connection (i.e., queued SYN request), a lazy
accept() would have to otherwise block until the server TCP stack receives a SYN/ACK
ACK, unless there is an external asynchronous notification mechanism to signal connection
completion to the application. It is unclear whether the implementation of lazy accept() in
Windows (which is currently the only major platform that supports this proactive mech-
anism) provides an asynchronous notification or lets the WSAAccept() system call on a
socket block (even if the socket is in non-blocking mode) until the three-way handshake is
completed. More importantly, a lazy accept() makes the application vulnerable to SYN
flood denial of service (DoS) attacks, where malicious clients do not send a SYN/ACK
ACK in response to a SYN/ACK. This can cause lazy accept() calls to stall. The queued
connections from malicious clients not only deplete server resources, they can also stall the
application by causing SYN segments from legitimate clients to be dropped.
Listen queue reservation
Another proactive method of ensuring that there are no listen queue overflows, while still
allowing the three-way handshake to be completed before connections are placed on the
listen queue, is to implement listen queue reservations. Whenever the server TCP stack
sends a SYN/ACK in response to a SYN, it reserves room for that connection in the listen
queue (in addition to adding an entry to the SYN queue). Room is freed for subsequent
reservations every time an entry is removed from the listen queue through an accept()
system call. Room can also be created in the listen queue whenever an entry is removed
from the SYN queue due to an error or a timeout (e.g., when the client resets the connection
or if the number of SYN/ACK retransmission attempts exceeds the maximum limit). The
server TCP stack sends a SYN/ACK only if there is room for a new reservation in the
listen queue. The reserv mechanism avoids listen queue overflows by ensuring only as
many SYN/ACK ACKs will be received as have been reserved in the listen queue. We
refer to the listen queue reservation mechanism as reserv.
To our knowledge, the reserv mechanism described above is novel. However, we arrived
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at it at the same time as the Dusi Accept() call described by Turner et al. [83] for the
Direct User Socket Interface within the ETA architecture. This call allows applications to
post asynchronous connection acceptance requests which reserve room in the listen queue.
In contrast to work by Turner et al., our listen queue reservation mechanism works with
the BSD sockets API and TCP stacks implemented in most existing operating systems.
Our current implementation of reserv is geared toward non-malicious clients in a LAN
environment. It primarily seeks to address the disconnection in TCP states at the client
and the server and to provide a better understanding of whether listen queue reservations
can improve server throughput. Hence, we assume that every client for which there is
a reservation in the listen queue will respond immediately with a SYN/ACK ACK. This
implementation can be generalized to allow for “overbooking” (similar to the overbooking
approach used for airline seat reservations) to account for clients whose SYN/ACK ACK
is delayed. In particular, in WAN environments we might need to send more SYN/ACKs
to high-latency clients than there are spaces for reservation, lest the server’s listen queue
becomes completely empty while the SYN/ACK ACKs from the clients are in transit5.
In general, the number of reservations can be bounded by the sum of the SYN queue
size, the listen queue size, and the number of client SYN/ACK ACKs in transit. A more
important shortcoming of our current reserv implementation is its vulnerability to attacks
from malicious clients. We defer the discussion of security implications of reserv until
Section 4.1.7.
4.1.3 Evaluation of the Listen Queue Overflow Solutions
We now compare the performance of abort and reserv against default. As described
in Section 3.3, we measure the throughput, response time, error rate, and queue drops
when these mechanisms are used with the user-space µserver and the kernel-space TUX
web servers. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the results obtained with the µserver and TUX
respectively. Note that for all the µserver results in this thesis (including those shown
in Figure 4.3), the x-axis starts at 12,000 requests/sec. We leave out data points prior
5Note that a client SYN/ACK ACK lost in transit will result in a SYN/ACK retransmission by the
















































































Figure 4.3: Evaluation of the µserver with listen queue overflow solutions
to 12,000 requests/sec out of the graphs because at these points the server is not under
overload and its reply rate matches the client request rate. For the same reason, the x-axis
in all the graphs for TUX starts at 20,000 requests/sec.
Figures 4.3(d) and 4.4(d) show that abort reduces the number of queue drops signifi-
cantly by ensuring that there is only one queue drop due to ListenQOverflow per connec-
tion. Surprisingly, reserv has significantly higher queue drops compared to abort. This
is due to retransmitted SYN segments from the clients. The server TCP stack does not
respond to a SYN with a SYN/ACK when there is no reservation available in the listen
queue. That is, it silently drops the SYN6. The SYN retransmission timeout at the client’s
TCP stack expires if it does not receive a SYN/ACK within a specific amount of time,
resulting in another SYN transmission7. This retransmitted SYN can also result in further
queue drops if there is no room for a reservation in the listen queue when it arrives at the
6In most UNIX TCP stacks, including Linux, whenever a SYN is dropped, it is dropped silently. No
notification is sent to the client [80].
















































































Figure 4.4: Evaluation of TUX with listen queue overflow solutions
server. Note that SYN retransmissions also influence the queue drops in abort, but to a
lesser degree because connection requests are mostly rejected at the ACK stage. Table 4.2
shows a per-second breakdown of connection establishment segments dropped at the SYN
stage, namely, “SYNs Dropped”, and either dropped or rejected at the ACK stage, namely,
“ACKs Reset/Dropped”, for three request rates with TUX.
The table demonstrates that with reserv, all connection establishment attempts are
dropped at the SYN stage, while with default, most attempts are dropped at the SYN
stage. The SYN drop rate is higher than the request rate in both of these mechanisms due
to SYN retransmissions by the clients. With abort, most attempts are rejected at the ACK
stage with fewer SYN drops compared to reserv or default. Note that with abort all of
the queue drops at SYN stage are due to ListenQFullAtSyn and not SynQ3/4Full. In our
low-latency LAN environment, a SYN/ACK ACK from a client arrives almost immediately
after the server sends a SYN/ACK. This ensures that connections occupy space in the SYN
queue for a very short time. The quick SYN/ACK ACK arrival does however put additional
pressure on the listen queue.
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26,000 26,828 5,135 2,992 5,698 27,195 0
30,000 39,966 4,734 12,341 9,818 40,782 0
34,000 53,216 4,283 21,312 13,259 53,883 0
Table 4.2: Breakdown of connection attempts dropped or rejected per second at the SYN
and ACK stages with TUX
Figures 4.3(a) and 4.4(a) indicate that neither abort nor reserv are able to provide
significant improvements in throughput over default. The peak8 throughput is the same
with all the three mechanisms. After the peak, abort and reserv provide less than
10% improvement in throughput over default in the µserver and a negligible increase in
throughput in TUX. It is also evident from Figures 4.3(b) and 4.4(b) that the response
times obtained with abort and reserv are fairly close to those obtained with default.
Note that we use a log scale for all the response time results in this thesis. The sharp spike
in response times after 19,000 requests/sec in Figure 4.3(b) corresponds to the server’s
peak (saturation point). After the peak (i.e., at 20,000 requests/sec), many clients have to
retransmit a SYN using an exponential backoff before they get a response from the server.
Hence, the average connection establishment time and consequently the response time
rises sharply. The lack of improvement in throughput with abort, despite the reduction
in the number of queue drops, is due to the overhead of processing retransmitted SYN
segments at the server. The same problem limits the throughput obtained with reserv.
In Section 4.1.4, we will analyze the overhead of processing retransmitted SYN segments
in detail.
Figure 4.4(c) shows that with TUX the error rate (i.e., the rate of connection failures
seen by the client) resulting from abort is 5%-10% higher than default. This is because
TUX is able to drain its listen queue very quickly by running in the kernel. The RST
sent when a SYN/ACK ACK is dropped due to ListenQOverflow is counter productive
because it terminates the client connection prematurely. On the other hand, with default
8The highest rate at which the server’s reply rate matches the request rate.
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subsequent segments transmitted by the client are treated as implied SYN/ACK ACKs
and if one such segment does not trigger ListenQOverflow (before the client times out),
the connection can be placed on the listen queue and is eventually serviced. Note that a
user-space server such as the µserver might not be able to drain its listen queue quickly
enough to keep up with the rate of incoming SYN/ACK ACKs. In such cases, by preventing
subsequent client transmissions from being treated as implied SYN/ACK ACKs (thereby
adding to the server’s burden), abort can actually reduce the error rate by up to 10% as
demonstrated in Figure 4.3(c).
Note that neither abort nor reserv affect the throughput, response time, queue drops,
or the error rate with either web servers prior to the peak (saturation point). We reiterate
that at loads below saturation, there are no queue drops, hence the implementation choices
for connection establishment have no impact on server throughput and response time.
Thus, abort and reserv succeed in eliminating the disconnect in the TCP states at the
end-points and alleviate load by relieving the server from handling data and FIN segments
transmitted following a silent SYN/ACK ACK drop. However, both these mechanisms
fail to improve throughput or response times because they do not mitigate the overhead
of processing retransmitted SYN segments. We will evaluate this overhead in the next
section.
4.1.4 Problem – Silent SYN Drop
As seen in Section 4.1.3, SYN retransmissions can increase the number of queue drops. In
this section, we analyze the impact of retransmitted SYN segments on server throughput
and response time under persistent overload.
Like any other TCP transmission, the client TCP stack sets up a retransmission timeout
whenever it sends a SYN segment to the server. If the SYN retransmission timeout expires
before a SYN/ACK is received, the client TCP stack retransmits the SYN and sets up
another timeout. This process continues until the server responds with a SYN/ACK, or
until the threshold for the maximum number of SYN retransmissions is reached.
Table 4.3 shows the SYN retransmission timeouts used in popular TCP stacks. Note
that some of the timeouts in the table (in particular those for Linux and FreeBSD) differ
from previously reported values by Jamjoom and Shin [45]. We obtained the timeouts
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Operating System SYN retransmission timeout (sec)
Linux 2.4/2.6 3, 6, 12, 24, 48
FreeBSD 5.3 3, 3.2, 3.2, 3.2, 3.2, 6.2, 12.2, 24.2
Mac OS X 10.3 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 6, 12, 24
Windows 9x, NT 3, 6, 12
Windows 2000/XP 3, 6
Table 4.3: SYN retransmissions timeouts in current TCP stacks
shown in Table 4.3 by observing the actual tcpdump output on different operating systems.
Figure 4.5 shows the tcpdump output of a Linux 2.4 client whose SYNs are silently
dropped by the server. It demonstrates that the client TCP stack will retransmit SYNs
up to five times – 3, 9, 21, 45, and 93 seconds9 after the original SYN transmission.
(1) 19:32:35.926222 s01.1033 > suzuka.55000: S 3600646294:3600646294(0) win 5840
(2) 19:32:38.923018 s01.1033 > suzuka.55000: S 3600646294:3600646294(0) win 5840
(3) 19:32:44.922816 s01.1033 > suzuka.55000: S 3600646294:3600646294(0) win 5840
(4) 19:32:56.922559 s01.1033 > suzuka.55000: S 3600646294:3600646294(0) win 5840
(5) 19:33:20.922018 s01.1033 > suzuka.55000: S 3600646294:3600646294(0) win 5840
(6) 19:34:08.912657 s01.1033 > suzuka.55000: S 3600646294:3600646294(0) win 5840
Figure 4.5: tcpdump output of a client whose SYNs are silently dropped while establishing
a connection
A client application can also prevent further SYN retransmissions by issuing a close()
system call on a socket descriptor that has not been connected. The SYN retransmission
timeout in the TCP stack is different from a timeout used by the client application or by the
end user, each of which might use a different timeout. For example, a user may stop trying
to connect to a web site if he or she does not get a response within 5 seconds. Similarly, a
web browser might close a connection after waiting for 15 seconds. In fact, the 10 second
application-level timeout used in all of our experiments allows for the retransmission of at
most two SYNs, which is lower than the maximum number of SYN retransmissions made
by the Linux TCP stack. As explained in Section 3.3, we take into account retransmissions
9These retransmission timings are cumulative values of the differences in successive lines in Figure 4.5.
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by the application or the end user by including them in the rate of incoming client requests.
As described in Section 2.1.1, if either the SYN or the listen queue is full, the server
TCP stack does not respond with a SYN/ACK. By ignoring the SYN, it forces the client
TCP stack to retransmit another SYN, hoping that the queues will have space for the
connection request at a later time [80]. Thus, an implicit assumption in silent SYN drops
is that the connection queues overflowed because of a momentary burst in traffic that
will subside in time to allow the retransmitted SYN segments to be processed. However,
under persistent overload conditions, such as during flash crowds, the server TCP stack
has to handle a large number of connection attempts for an extended period of time. The
duration of overload at the server is much longer than the client application timeout as
well as the maximum SYN retransmission timeout used in most client TCP stacks. That
is, the majority of clients retransmit their SYNs while the server is still overloaded. Hence,
the server TCP stack is forced to process retransmitted SYN segments from “old” (i.e.,
client TCP stacks that are retrying) connections, in addition to a steady rate of incoming
SYN requests arising from “new” connections.
Cost of Processing Retransmitted SYN Segments Under Overload
In order to understand why abort did not improve server performance in Section 4.1.3,
we now evaluate the overhead of processing retransmitted SYN segments under overload.
We profiled our server using oprofile [41], a system-wide profiler, to determine the
percentage of CPU time spent in kernel-space as well as user-space code. Note that as de-
scribed in Section 3.2, our workloads do not require disk accesses and there are no network
bottlenecks in our experimental environment. We then grouped the functions reported in
the flat profile into different categories for a component-level analysis. Since we are inter-
ested in analyzing Internet servers, we used the following categories – driver (interrupt-
handling and NAPI-based packet-processing), net-ip (IP packet-processing), net-tcp (TCP
segment-processing), net-socket (socket API, including skbuff management), net-other
(protocol-independent device support), mm (generic memory management), other-kernel
(all other kernel routines such as process, and file-system management), and server appli-
cation (TUX or the µserver).
For simplicity, we discuss profiling results obtained by running the in-kernel TUX server
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Table 4.4: Breakdown of CPU time spent in kernel components near peak load and under
overload summarized from oprofile data for TUX with abort on the one-packet workload
with abort on the one-packet workload. The results with the µserver are qualitatively
similar, except for the additional event-notification overhead that one would expect from a
user-space, event-driven network server. Table 4.4 shows the component-level profiles for
two data points, one just before the peak (17,500 requests/sec), and one under overload
(25,000 requests/sec). Note that the total CPU time does not add up to 100% because it
excludes time taken by the oprofile daemon. Note also that the peak rate is lower with
profiling enabled – without profiling TUX peaks near 22,000 requests/sec with abort, as
shown in Figure 4.4(a).
As the load exerted on the server increases, the TCP component dominates the CPU
usage. The CPU consumption of TCP segment processing goes up from about 17% to
22% as the request rate increases from 17,500 to 25,000. The CPU usage of all other
components except “driver” (as explained below) remains approximately the same. Even
with an increase in server load, the application (shown as “net-tux”) does not get a pro-
portionately higher share of CPU time to complete work on existing requests or to accept
new connections.
The amount of time spent in the driver component decreases with an increase in load
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because as explained in Section 2.2.2, we have enabled NAPI in our experiments to avoid
interrupt-driven receiver livelock. With NAPI, the networking subsystem resorts to peri-
odic polling under high loads to prevent interrupt handling from hogging the CPU. NAPI
also ensures that tasks other than packet-processing (e.g., the web server) get adequate
CPU time under overload at the server. In other statistics collected during the experiments
(but not shown here), we have observed that the amount of time spent polling is lower
before the peak load (at 17,500 requests/sec) compared to under overload (at 25,000 re-
quests/sec)10. Hence, under overload, with strategies to counter receiver livelock in place,
TCP segment-processing code becomes one of the major consumers of CPU cycles.
It is instructive to determine the cause of the increase in CPU cycles consumed by the
TCP component when the server is overloaded. Table 4.5 (which corresponds to TUX
results for abort in Figure 4.4) shows the breakdown of incoming TCP segments as the
load exerted increases. The expected number of SYN segments is computed by multi-
plying the request rate by the duration of the experiment (around 120 seconds). The
difference between the actual and expected SYN segments received can be attributed to
SYN retransmissions from the clients11.
TCP Statistic Request Rate
22,000 28,000 34,000
Expected SYN segments 2,640,000 3,360,000 4,080,000
Actual SYN segments 2,640,011 4,156,497 6,385,607
Actual SYN/ACK ACK segments 2,640,011 3,323,742 3,828,060
Connection establishment segments 5,280,022 7,480,239 10,213,667
Established connections 2,640,011 2,372,030 2,236,980
Ratio of estab. conn. to actual SYN segments 1 0.57 0.35
Total segments 15,840,231 16,968,566 19,161,742
Table 4.5: Incoming TCP segment statistics near peak load and under overload for TUX
with abort on the one-packet workload
10 Consequently, the number of interrupts per second is higher at 17,500 requests/sec.
11More correctly, a difference greater than 50 is due to SYN retransmissions, a value less than that can
be caused by our workload generator running slightly longer than the specified duration.
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As the load exerted increases, the number of connection establishment segments (i.e.,
SYN plus SYN/ACK ACK segments) received and processed at the server increases rapidly
compared to the number of segments destined for already established connections. For
example, at 22,000 requests/sec, only a third of the total TCP segments received are for
establishing connections (i.e., 5,280,029 out of 15,840,231), while at 34,000 request/sec,
more than half of the total TCP segments processed constitute an attempt to establish a
connection (i.e., 10,213,667 out of 19,161,742). The increase in connection establishment
segments is primarily due to retransmitted SYN segments. As shown in Table 4.5 under
overload, retransmitted SYN segments significantly increase the aggregate TCP traffic at
the server. This corroborates results presented by Jamjoom and Shin [45], who report
that SYN retransmissions result in close to two-folds increase in traffic at the server during
flash crowds. As we will demonstrate in Figure 4.9, many client connection attempts
require the server to process more than one SYN segments before the connection is either
established, aborted, or timed out. As the server TCP stack spends more time processing
SYN segments, the number of connections that it is able to actually establish and process
decreases. We will discuss the implications of retransmitted SYN segments on server
throughput and response time in detail in Section 4.1.6. At this point, however, we can
conclude that a significant portion of the server’s CPU resources are devoted to processing
retransmitted TCP SYN segments under overload.
The high cost of handling retransmitted SYN segments is not because of a poor im-
plementation of SYN processing in the Linux networking stack. On the contrary, the
SYN-processing implementation in most modern TCP stacks, including Linux, is meant
to be efficient to minimize the damage from SYN flood attacks [54]. As discussed in Sec-
tion 5.4, dropping SYN segments at an earlier stage in the networking stack (e.g., at the
IP layer as done by some firewalls such as netfilter) does not mitigate the negative
performance impact of retransmitted SYN segments.
4.1.5 Alternatives to Silent SYN Drop
In this section, we describe approaches that attempt to alleviate TCP segment-processing
load resulting from retransmitted SYN segments at the server. These solutions can be
64
broadly classified as follows12.
1. Sending a RST to a client whenever a SYN is dropped.
2. An approach such as persistent dropping [45] to filter out retransmitted SYN seg-
ments with lower overhead. Note that in persistent dropping, retransmitted SYN
segments are still dropped silently.
3. Dropping no SYN segments, but rejecting connection establishment attempts at the
ACK stage instead.
Persistent dropping was discussed in Section 2.2.3. We describe the other alternatives
in detail in the following subsections.
Send RST on a SYN Drop
When under overload, instead of silently dropping SYN segments, the server TCP stack
can explicitly notify clients to stop the further retransmission of SYNs. One way of achiev-
ing this is to send a RST whenever a SYN is dropped. Note that the abort mechanism
involves sending a RST whenever a SYN/ACK ACK is dropped. Usually, a RST is sent
in response to a SYN to indicate that there is no listening socket at the specified port on
the server13. As per RFC 793, the client TCP stack should then give up on the connec-
tion and indicate a failure to the client application. Typically upon receiving a RST, a
connect() call by the application would fail with an error such as ECONNREFUSED. Note
that a client application is free to continue to retry a connection even after it receives an
ECONNREFUSED error from its TCP stack, but most well-written applications would give
up attempting the connection. By sending a RST when a SYN is dropped14, we elimi-
nate TCP-level retransmissions, which are transparent to the client application. In order
to notify a client when the server is overloaded so that it can prevent further connection
attempts (i.e., avoid SYN retransmissions), we modified the server TCP stack in Linux
12Note that this list is not exhaustive.
13A RST in response to a SYN in TCP is equivalent to an ICMP “Port Unreachable” message [80].
14Note that if a RST sent to a client is lost under wide-area network connections, it is no different than
a silent SYN drop, a client will retransmit a SYN when its retransmission timeout expires.
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to send a RST whenever a SYN is dropped. This behaviour can be chosen through the
net.ipv4.tcp drop syn with rst sysctl. We refer to this mechanism as rst-syn15.
Note that rst-syn only affects client behaviour at the SYN stage and is typically used
in conjunction with ACK stage mechanisms described in Section 4.1.2. That is, we can
use rst-syn in conjunction with the listen queue reservation mechanism to send RST
to clients whenever a reservation is not available, we refer to this mechanism as reserv
rst-syn. Similarly, when rst-syn is used in conjunction with the aborting of connec-
tions on ListenQOverflow-induced SYN/ACK ACK drops, we call the resulting mechanism
abort rst-syn.
While we developed rst-syn independently after discovering the high overhead of pro-
cessing retransmitted SYNs, we later discovered that some TCP stacks, including those
on some Windows operating systems, already implement such a mechanism [59]16. As in-
dicated earlier, most UNIX TCP stacks drop SYN segments silently. In this context, the
results presented in this thesis can be viewed as a comparison of the different connection
establishment mechanisms implemented in current TCP stacks.
Before presenting the results of rst-syn, we point out its shortcomings. Sending a
RST in response to a SYN when there is a listening socket at the client-specified port
implies overloading the semantics of a RST [34]. RFC 793 states: “As a general rule, reset
(RST) must be sent whenever a segment arrives which apparently is not intended for the
current connection. A reset must not be sent if it is not clear that this is the case” [73].
While it can be argued that from the server’s point-of-view the RST achieves the desired
effect of preventing further SYN retransmissions from clients, such an approach violates
the recommendations of RFC 793. In particular, a client TCP stack which receives a
RST from the server is unable to determine whether the RST is because of an incorrectly
specified port, or due to overload at the server. Unfortunately, no other alternative seems
to be available in current TCP implementations to allow an overloaded server to notify
clients to stop retransmitting SYN segments. An approach that could provide such a
functionality is suggested in RFC 1122 – “A RST segment could contain ASCII text that
encoded and explained the cause of the RST” [17]. A server TCP stack would indicate that
15An abbreviation of “RST in response to a SYN on a SYN drop”.
16Some firewalls also use rst-syn for congestion control [34].
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it is overloaded in its RST segment. Client TCP stacks could then notify the applications
about the overload at the server with an error such as ESERVEROVRLD. Unfortunately, such
an approach would require modifications to existing TCP stack implementations at the
clients. In this thesis, we explore approaches to allow the server to notify clients that it
is overloaded with currently deployed client TCP stacks, and evaluate the effectiveness of
such approaches.
Another problem with rst-syn is that it relies on client cooperation. Some client TCP
stacks, notably those on Microsoft Windows, immediately resend a SYN upon getting a
RST for a previous SYN17. Note that this behaviour does not follow the specifications of
RFC 793. As shown in Figure 4.6, RFC 793 explicitly specifies that a client TCP stack
should abort connection attempts upon receiving a RST in response to a SYN.
If the state is SYN-SENT then
[checking of ACK bit omitted]
If the RST bit is set
If the ACK was acceptable then signal the user
"error: connection reset", drop the segment, enter CLOSED state,
delete TCB, and return.
Otherwise (no ACK) drop the segment and return.
Figure 4.6: Event-processing steps for handling RSTs received in SYN SENT state specified
in RFC 793 [73]
By retransmitting a SYN upon receiving a RST, Windows TCP stacks introduce un-
necessary SYN segments into the network when the client is attempting to connect to a
server at a non-existent port18. The number of times SYNs are retried in this fashion is
a tunable system parameter, which defaults to 2 retries in Windows 2000/XP and 3 re-
tries in Windows NT [60]. Microsoft provides the following rationale for their decision to
retry SYNs – “The approach of Microsoft platforms is that the system administrator has
the freedom to adjust TCP performance-related settings to their own tastes, namely the
17Microsoft client TCP stacks ignore “ICMP port unreachable” messages in a similar fashion, retrying
a SYN instead [45].
18A port which does not have an associated listening socket on the server.
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maximum retry ... The advantage of this is that the service you are trying to reach may
have temporarily shut down and might resurface in between SYN attempts. In this case,
it is convenient that the connect() waited long enough to obtain a connection since the
service really was there” [60]. While a user familiar with RFC 793 can set this parameter
to zero, we assume that most users run with the default values. Also note that in contrast
to SYN retransmissions when no SYN/ACKs are received from the server, SYNs are re-
tried immediately by the Windows client TCP stack – no exponential backoff mechanism
is used.
We will refer to the behaviour of Windows-like TCP stacks that retry a SYN upon
receiving a RST for a previous SYN as win-syn-retry. To our knowledge, there are no
(public) results that quantify the effects of the win-syn-retry behaviour with server TCP
stacks which do send a RST to reject a SYN. On the other hand, some past work has cited
the win-syn-retry behaviour as a justification for dropping SYN segments silently [45, 85].
In this thesis, we test this hypothesis by evaluating the effectiveness of rst-syn with RFC
793-compliant as well as win-syn-retry TCP stacks.
Unfortunately, our workload generator (httperf) is UNIX-specific and non-trivial to
port to the Windows API. Hence, we modified the Linux TCP stack in our clients to
implement the win-syn-retry behaviour. If a configurable option is set, our client stacks
retransmit SYNs up to 3 times after receiving a RST for the original SYN. Note that we
have chosen an aggressive retry value of 3 (default in Windows 98/NT) instead of 2 (default
in Windows 2000/XP), which we suspect would be used in most current Windows client
TCP stacks. We will refer to our emulation of the win-syn-retry behaviour in Linux as
win-emu.
No SYN Drops
Silently dropping SYN segments results in SYN retransmissions in all client TCP stacks.
Notifying the client that is should abort SYN retransmissions with a RST is not effective
in stopping SYN retries with win-syn-retry TCP stacks. To workaround this problem,
we developed a mechanism which avoids retransmissions of TCP connection establishment
segments, albeit in an ungainly fashion. The key idea of this mechanism is to drop no
SYN segments, but to instead notify the client of a failure to establish a connection at the
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ACK stage. Thus, we send a SYN/ACK in response to every SYN, irrespective of whether
there is space available in the SYN queue or the listen queue. We later use abort to reset
those connections whose SYN/ACK ACKs cannot be accommodated in the listen queue.
We refer to this mechanism as no-syn-drop.
An obvious limitation of no-syn-drop is that we give some clients false impression of
the server’s ability to establish a connection. In reality, under overload, we can only accom-
modate a portion of the SYN/ACK ACKs from the clients in the listen queue, so we have
to abort some established client connections19. Upon receiving a RST on an established
connection, all client TCP stacks that we are aware of (including Microsoft Windows) im-
mediately cease further transmissions. An ECONNRESET error is reported to the application
on its next system call on that connection. Most well-written client applications, including
all browsers that we are aware of, already handle this error. We reiterate that the only
reason for exploring no-syn-drop is due to a lack of an appropriate mechanism in cur-
rent TCP implementations to notify clients (particularly, win-syn-retry clients) about
an overload at the server in order to stop retransmission attempts. Note that when a RST
in sent to a client whose SYN/ACK ACK triggers ListenQOverflow, all state information
about the client connection at the server TCP stack is destroyed (with both abort and
no-syn-drop). If this RST is lost in a WAN environment, subsequent (data or FIN) seg-
ments from the client will be answered with a RST by the server TCP stack. In this way,
the client will eventually receive a notification of the server’s inability to continue with the
connection.
In order to ensure that there are no SYN drops with no-syn-drop, we eliminated the
ListenQFullAtSyn rule while processing SYN segments in the Linux TCP stack. Note that
as a result of eliminating this rule, we expect many more listen queue overflows. We had
to use another technique to ensure that SYN segments are not dropped when the SYN
queue is full. While we have not observed any SYN drops because of a full SYN queue20
with abort or reserv in our environment, the SYN queue could get close to full with
high-latency clients in a WAN environment.
We use TCP SYN cookies [54, 14], a mechanism originally created to guard against SYN
19 Note that the connections aborted are in the ESTABLISHED state only at the client.
20More precisely due to SynQ3/4Full.
69
flood denial of service attacks, to ensure that SYNs are not dropped due to lack of space in
the SYN queue. SYN cookies do not save any information about incomplete connections
at the server, thereby giving the impression of an unbounded SYN queue. The server
TCP stack sends a specially-crafted sequence number (the cookie) in its SYN/ACK that
encodes information that would normally be saved in the SYN queue. When a SYN/ACK
ACK arrives, the server recreates the incomplete request based on the sequence number
acknowledged. Note that the SYN cookies approach has some limitations – in particular
not all TCP options (e.g., window scaling) included in a SYN are encoded in a SYN/ACK,
these cannot be reconstructed from the SYN/ACK ACK received, so this information
is lost [54]. Hence, most UNIX TCP stacks use SYN cookies as a fall-back mechanism
only after the SYN queue is completely full. We also had to fix the TCP SYN cookies
implementation in Linux to properly implement abort. Several 2.4 and 2.6 kernel sources
that we examined (including the latest 2.6.11.6) did not check if abort on overflow (which
implements abort in Linux) is enabled when SYN cookies are used – a potential oversight
on the part of the networking developers since neither SYN cookies nor abort on overflow
are enabled by default. As discussed in Section 4.1.1 without abort, server throughput
is degraded on a silent listen queue overflow, this problem is exacerbated by relaxing the
ListenQFullAtSyn rule when responding to a SYN. In our evaluation of no-syn-drop, we
use a modified Linux TCP stack, which enforces abort when used in conjunction with
SYN cookies.
4.1.6 Evaluation of Silent SYN Drop Alternatives
In this section, we evaluate server performance with rst-syn on RFC 793-compliant clients,
and with rst-syn and no-syn-drop on Windows-like (win-emu) clients.
Regular Clients
We first evaluate server throughput and response times with rst-syn on client TCP stacks
which follow RFC 793, and abort a connection attempt upon receiving a RST in response
to a SYN. We will refer to such client TCP stacks as regular clients. As indicated earlier,























































































Figure 4.7: Evaluation of the µserver with alternatives to silent SYN drop
and 4.8 demonstrate that when abort and reserv are combined with rst-syn, they yield
a significant improvements in throughput and client response times.
As shown in Figure, 4.7(a) abort rst-syn increases the peak throughput of the µserver
by 11% compared to abort, and offers around 20% improvement after the peak, which in-
creases as the request rate is increased. Similarly, reserv rst-syn increases the peak
throughput of the µserver by 11% compared to reserv, and provides more than 24%
improvement in throughput after the peak. While the peak throughput of TUX, shown
in 4.8(a), is not changed, abort rst-syn results in close to 10% improvement after the
peak. The throughput in TUX with reserv rst-syn is also more than 12% higher com-
pared to reserv, and this gap increases at higher rates.
Note that the improvement in throughput with rst-syn is consistent across the board
for all request rates, and increases at higher request rates. When compared to default,
























































































Figure 4.8: Evaluation of TUX with alternatives to silent SYN drop
in the µserver, and around an 8% increase in throughput after the peak in TUX. The
corresponding numbers for improvements in throughput provided by reserv rst-syn over
default are 35% in the µserver and 15% in TUX. Throughput improves with rst-syn
because it eliminates the cost of processing retransmitted SYN segments, which allows more
time to be devoted to completing work on established connections. In reserv rst-syn we
reject a connection attempt at the SYN stage instead of the ACK stage, resulting in one
less packet sent and received by the server per connection, hence, its throughput is slightly
better than that of abort rst-syn. The gains obtained from rst-syn can be explained
by the general principle of dropping a connection as early as possible under overload [63].
As shown in Figures 4.7(b) and 4.8(b), the response time is reduced by two orders
of magnitude with rst-syn in both the µserver and TUX. Recall that by response time,
we imply the average response time measured at clients for successful connections. The
response time is the sum of the connection establishment time and the data transfer time.
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When the server is overloaded, a substantial amount of time is spent establishing connec-
tions. SYNs might have to be retransmitted multiple times before a SYN/ACK is received
and the connect() call returns on the client. Once a server accepts a client connection
(i.e., puts it on the listen queue), the amount of time spent in transferring data is small
for the one-packet workload compared to the connection time, so it does not affect the
response time significantly. On an average it takes around 3 seconds for the client to es-
tablish a connection, but less than 100 milliseconds to get a response once the connection
has been established, when either default or abort are used at the server. On the other
hand, with rst-syn, a client connection attempt fails immediately. Clients which do get
a response for a SYN, receive it without having to resort to SYN retransmissions. As a
result, the average connection establishment time, and hence the average client response
time tends to be very short. We can get higher throughput as well as lower response time
with rst-syn because the server is under persistent overload. The server can reject some
clients immediately, but it always has a sustained rate of new clients to handle, so its
throughput does not decrease. We believe that under high load, it is better to provide
good service to some clients along with an immediate notification of failure to the rest of
the clients, rather than giving poor service to all the clients.
Figure 4.7(c) demonstrates using the µserver that rejecting connections at the SYN
stage does not result in a higher error rate. That is, the improvements in response times
are not because the server handles fewer clients. In fact, both abort rst-syn and reserv
rst-syn actually reduce the number of clients which do not receive a server response
compared to default. The error rate when TUX is used in conjunction with abort and
abort rst-syn (shown in Figure 4.8(c)) is higher than default because as described in
Section 4.1.3, aborting connections when SYN/ACK ACKs cannot be accommodated in
the listen queue is counter productive in TUX. That is, the increase in the error rate is
due to abort, not because of rst-syn. Note that the error rate with reserv and reserv
rst-syn is lower than that with default, even in TUX. As expected, the error rate is
equal to the rate of queue drops with abort rst-syn and reserv rst-syn because the
retransmission of connection establishment segments is eliminated.
It is instructive to examine how many connection attempts, both successful as well
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Figure 4.9: Breakdown of connection attempts and failures based on number of SYNs
transmitted with default, abort, and abort rst-syn in TUX for three different request
rates
provide a better understanding of why the throughput is lower and the client response times
are higher with both these mechanisms when compared to abort rst-syn (or reserv
rst-syn). Figure 4.9 shows a breakdown of all connection attempts and failures (errors)
based on the number of SYN segments transmitted using default, abort, and abort
rst-syn while running the µserver. Note that the connection attempts and errors for each
mechanism are shown for three different request rates, namely, 22,000, 28,000, and 34,000.
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Recall that a 10 second timeout allows at most three SYN transmissions, two of which
occur after the previous SYN retransmission timeout expires. Recall also that the num-
ber of connections attempted is determined based on the request rate and the duration
for which that rate was run. Connection attempts include all connections that were: (i)
successfully serviced, (ii) rejected (either through abort or rst-syn) by the server, or (iii)
timed out by the client. Rejected or timed out connections add up to failed connections
(i.e., errors). Any connection, whether successful or rejected that lasts for less than 3 sec-
onds requires only one SYN transmission (i.e., the original connection attempt). Similarly
those connections that last for more than 6 seconds and 9 seconds require two and three
SYN transmissions, respectively. Finally, a connection that has to be timed out by the
application results in three SYN transmissions. We accordingly added counters to httperf
to categorize connections based on how many SYNs they transmitted. Note that each con-
nection is counted exactly once based on the number of SYN transmissions. For example,
a connection that is established on the third SYN retransmission, and gets a response from
the server after 9.5 seconds is categorized as requiring three SYN transmissions.
The number of connections attempted (“attempts”) by default, abort, as well as
abort rst-syn is same for each request rate shown in Figure 4.9. On the other hand,
the number of failed connections (“errors”) differs in these mechanisms, it is the lowest
with abort rst-syn. The number of successful connections can be obtained by factoring
out the “errors” bar from the “attempts” bar. For example, with default, all connec-
tion attempts that require only two SYN transmissions represent successful connections
because there are no connections which fail after just two transmissions. All client connec-
tions require a single SYN transmission with abort rst-syn, after which they are either
successfully serviced or reset by the server (using rst-syn). Note that the work involved
at the server to deliver data to the clients in the one-packet workload is minimal, hence,
no connections timeout after they are established. With default, a failed connection re-
quires three SYN retransmissions, after which the client application gives up and times out
a connection for which its TCP stack has not received a SYN/ACK from the server (i.e., a
connection where the application’s connect() call does not succeed for 10 seconds). With
abort, a connection can fail for two reasons – if a client does not receive a SYN/ACK
after three SYN transmissions, or if it does receive a SYN/ACK on any of its SYN trans-
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missions, but the server responds to its subsequent SYN/ACK ACK with a RST due to a
listen queue overflow.
Figure 4.9 shows that as the load exerted on the server increases, a typical connection
attempt involves the transmission of more than one SYN segment with default as well as
with abort. At 22,000 request/sec, the percentage of connections requiring only one SYN
transmission is 48% with default and 66% with abort. However, at 34,000 requests/sec,
this figure drops to just 26% with default and 37% with abort. In comparison, the per-
centage of connections requiring three SYN retransmissions (which consists mostly of failed
connections) is 69% with default and 43% with abort. As described earlier, with abort
rst-syn, all connections (both successful and failed) require a single SYN transmission.
The lack of SYN retransmissions not only reduces the client response times, but also allows
the server to spend more time on established connections, resulting in higher throughput.
Recall from Section 3.1.1, that we have not configured TUX and µserver to facilitate
a direct comparison. While higher response times obtained with TUX (shown in Fig-
ure 4.8(b)) in comparison to those obtained with the µserver (shown in Figure 4.7(b)) may
appear to be suggestive, this difference is because of the different configurations used in
both the servers. Both the servers use different listen queue sizes – 128 in the µserver
compared to 2048 in TUX21. The larger listen queue allows more connections to buffered
before TUX can work on them, thereby increasing the average response time. That is,
there is an inverse relationship between the number of connections buffered in the listen
queue and the average response time for those connections22. The response times obtained
with TUX using a smaller listen queue (with 128 entries) is comparable to those obtained
with the µserver.
Thus, rst-syn is effective in improving server throughput and reducing client re-
sponse times on regular clients by eliminating SYN retransmissions. As discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1.7, there are some security implications of using reserv (with or without rst-syn)
in production environments. While abort takes a reactive approach to SYN/ACK ACK
drops rather than avoiding them, it is significantly easier to implement than reserv. We
21Recall that the listen queue sizes were chosen to be the default values in Linux.
22This relationship suggests that making the queue sizes too large is counter productive because it
increases client response times and might result in more timed out connections. This result is well known
in queueing theory.
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consider abort rst-syn to be a more viable mechanism that adequately addresses server
performance as well as security requirements. Hence, in the remainder of this thesis, we
only present the results of abort rst-syn.
Windows-like Clients
In this section, we compare the results of abort rst-syn and no-syn-drop against
abort23 when used with the win-emu clients. We only present the µserver results in
this section. TUX results are similar and do not provide additional insight, so we omit
them. We also include the results of abort rst-syn on regular clients (denoted “abort


















































































Figure 4.10: Evaluation of the µserver with win-emu clients
Figure 4.10(a) shows that the throughput with abort rst-syn win-emu is lower than
23We chose abort because it is implemented in most UNIX TCP stacks, noting that default has slightly
lower throughput than abort.
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that with abort rst-syn. This is because of the SYNs retried by win-emu clients upon
receiving a RST. The throughput provided by abort rst-syn win-emu is initially com-
parable to that obtained with abort win-emu, however, as the request rate increases, its
throughput drops below that obtained with abort win-emu. A client that does not re-
ceive a SYN/ACK in response to its SYN retransmits a SYN at most twice with abort
win-emu, but up to three times with abort rst-syn win-emu, which explains the gap
in the queue drops between these two mechanisms in Figure 4.10(d). As shown in Fig-
ure 4.10(b), the client response time is reduced by two order of magnitude with abort
rst-syn compared to abort, even on win-emu clients. Windows TCP stacks (and hence
our emulation thereof) resend another SYN immediately upon receiving a RST for a previ-
ous SYN. An immediate retransmission ensures that the connection establishment times,
and hence, the response times, remain low for clients that receive responses from the server
on subsequent SYN transmissions24.
By avoiding the retransmission of connection establishment segments, no-syn-drop
allows more time to be spent completing work on established connections. As a result,
its throughput, at and after the peak, is more than 15% higher than that of abort
win-emu and abort rst-syn win-emu. The throughput and response time resulting from
no-syn-drop is comparable to that provided by abort rst-syn on regular clients. This
demonstrates that it is possible to deploy mechanisms that are effective in reducing response
time and improving server throughput in currently deployed client TCP stacks, including
those on Windows. A mechanism like no-syn-drop obviates the need for techniques to
filter retransmitted SYNs with a lower overhead, such as those proposed by Jamjoom and
Shin [45]. The efficiency of techniques such as SYN policing [85] can also be improved by
using no-syn-drop to eliminate retransmitted connection attempts by clients25.
24abort rst-syn will fail to improve the response times with a win-syn-retry TCP stack that uses an
exponential backoff for the resending a SYN in response to a RST. However, we are not aware of such a
TCP stack.
25Note that with no-syn-drop, we might have to perform SYN/ACK ACK policing instead of SYN
policing.
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4.1.7 Security Implications of Connection Establishment Mech-
anisms
In recent years, resilience in the face of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, especially SYN
flood attacks by malicious clients has been a major criteria influencing the implementation
choices for connection establishment in many server TCP stacks [54]. Techniques such as
SYN cache, SYN cookies, and early discard of invalid ACK segments have been proposed
to prevent malicious clients from consuming most of the server resources, thereby denying
service to legitimate clients. In this section we briefly discuss the security implications of the
connection establishment mechanisms discussed in this thesis, focusing on the susceptibility
of the server to SYN flood attacks. Note that we do not consider generic denial of service
attacks (e.g., attacks attempting to flood the server’s network link with invalid TCP/IP
packets) because the server TCP stack, by itself, is unable to provide protection against
such attacks without an external firewall or packet filtering mechanism. As described in
Section 2.2.3, protecting servers from generic denial of service attacks is still an area of
active research.
In a SYN flood attack malicious clients attempt to overwhelm the server by sending a
constant stream of TCP SYN requests. The source address in these requests is typically
forged to be non-existent or unreachable hosts, leaving the server with many incomplete
connections in its SYN queue, each waiting for a SYN/ACK response. Each of these SYN
queue entries not only utilize server resources but they also fill up the SYN queue, thereby
increasing the probability of the subsequent dropping of SYNs from legitimate clients. As
described in Section 4.1.5, TCP SYN cookies [14, 54] can be used to obtain a virtually
unbounded SYN queue without storing any information about incomplete connections at
the server. Current production TCP stacks (in many UNIX-like systems) already use SYN
cookies in conjunction with mechanisms such as default and abort to protect the server
from SYN flood attacks.
This leads to the following question – Are the two new connection establishment mech-
anisms described in this thesis, no-syn-drop and reserv vulnerable to SYN flood attacks?
The no-syn-drop mechanism guards against SYN flood attacks by relying on SYN cook-
ies. It is no more vulnerable to other network flooding attacks than other connection
establishment mechanism. Our current implementation of reserv, on the other hand,
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does introduce additional security concerns because it assumes that all clients that re-
ceive a SYN/ACK respond immediately with a SYN/ACK ACK. By sending bogus SYN
segments, malicious clients can not only occupy entries in the SYN queue, they can also
consume listen queue reservations. This can cause SYN segments from legitimate clients
to be dropped because no listen queue reservations are available (in addition to SYN drops
because the SYN queue is full). Note that the size of the listen queue is typically smaller
than the size of the SYN queue in most TCP stacks. All of the proactive solutions to avoid
listen queue overflows, discussed in Section 4.1.2, are similarly vulnerable to SYN flood
attacks. There is a trade-off between the extra work (e.g., processing and sending a RST
in response to a SYN/ACK ACK that is dropped) and involved in reactive approaches to
listen queue overflows such as abort and the vulnerability to SYN flood attacks entailed
by proactive solutions.
We could use SYN cookies to get an unbounded SYN queue in conjunction with an
overbooking of the listen queue, a probabilistic drop of SYNs (similar to Random Early
Drop [33]), and a periodic clean up of least-recently-used items, to improve the robustness
of reserv against SYN flood attacks. However, given the complexity involved with such
an implementation of reserv and the fact that server performance with abort is close to
that obtained with reserv (when both are used in conjunction with rst-syn), it is unclear
whether there are any real advantages26 to incorporating reserv in current production
TCP stacks. If network-based proposals to counter denial of service attacks such as ingress
and egress filtering, rate limiting, and unicast reverse path forwarding become widespread
and succeed in ensuring that all TCP segments that make their way to the server are
from legitimate clients, it would be feasible to deploy our existing reserv implementation,
without requiring any security-related changes.
26Note that reserv is more correct than abort based on a strict interpretation of RFC 793.
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4.2 Impact of TCP Connection Termination on Server
Performance
In this section, we examine alternatives to the standard connection termination mechanism
suggested in RFC 793, at the server TCP stack as well as in the client application, and
evaluate their impact on the throughput of overloaded servers
As demonstrated in Figure 2.3 and as described in Section 2.1.2, a graceful connec-
tion termination by the client, either with half-closed connection semantics (through the
shutdown() system call) or in half-duplex fashion (through the close() system call), re-
sults in a FIN being sent to the server. The server TCP stack has no way of knowing
whether the client is using half-closed connection semantics. Most server TCP stacks
assume that connections are terminated using half-closed semantics by the clients.
Supporting half-closed connections can result in an imprudent use of resources at an
overloaded server. Many browsers and web crawlers terminate connections (including those
connections that timeout or are aborted by the user) by issuing a close() system call.
That is, they do not use half-closed connection semantics. However, because the server
TCP stack supports half-closed connections, it continues to make queued data available to
the server application (i.e., the web server) through read() calls, even after receiving a FIN
from a client. Only when the data queue is completely drained will read() return EOF
(0) notifying the server application that the client has terminated the connection. Any
prior non-zero read() call is processed by the application and can result in subsequent
writes. The effort spent generating and writing data at the server is wasteful because upon
receiving the data the client TCP stack responds with a RST when the application does
not use half-closed connection semantics for terminating a connection.
Figure 4.11 illustrates the flow of TCP segments from a client (s01) that has timed
out and terminated its connection through a close() call (line 6). The server (suzuka)
TCP stack immediately acknowledges the client’s FIN (line 7). After 25 seconds, the server
application is able to read() the request, and writes the appropriate response (line 8). The
following read() returns EOF, so the server application issues a close() call to terminate
its end of the connection (line 9). The client application is not using half-closed connection
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(1) 12:41:57.297282 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: S 1159260550:1159260550(0) win 5840
(2) 12:41:57.297305 suzuka.55000 > s01.1024: S 882478789:882478789(0)
ack 1159260551 win 5792
(3) 12:41:57.297531 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: . ack 1 win 5840
(4) 12:41:57.297532 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: P 1:80(79) ack 1 win 5840
(5) 12:41:57.297554 suzuka.55000 > s01.1024: . ack 80 win 46
(6) 12:41:58.797487 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: F 80:80(0) ack 1 win 5840
(7) 12:41:58.837288 suzuka.55000 > s01.1024: . ack 81 win 46
(8) 12:42:23.079113 suzuka.55000 > s01.1024: P 1:1013(1012) ack 81 win 46
(9) 12:42:23.079131 suzuka.55000 > s01.1024: F 1013:1013(0) ack 81 win 46
(10) 12:42:23.079240 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: R 1159260631:1159260631(0) win 0
(11) 12:42:23.079364 s01.1024 > suzuka.55000: R 1159260631:1159260631(0) win 0
Figure 4.11: tcpdump output of a client that times out
semantics so the client TCP stack responds with a RST27 to every server reply (lines 10,
11).
Client-initiated connection termination is common for HTTP 1.1 persistent connections.
In most server TCP stacks, this can result in web servers wasting resources on connections
even after they have been terminated by the client. For HTTP 1.0 connections, the server
typically initiates the connection termination after sending a response. Note that studies
have advocated the use of client-initiated connection termination to prevent the server
from having many connections in the TIME WAIT state [31, 81]. It is also possible for
both sides to simultaneously terminate their end of the connection. While it is unlikely
to happen in a browser-web server environment, a simultaneous connection termination
obviates the need for the server to support half-closed connections.
4.2.1 Disabling Support for Half-Closed Connections
We describe a mechanism that can help isolate the impact of supporting half-closed connec-
tions on server throughput under overload in this section. In particular, we are interested
in answering the following question – If the server TCP stack were to drop support for
27Note that a RST from the client can cause subsequent system calls by the server application on that
socket to fail with an ECONNRESET error.
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half-closed connections and treat all FINs as an indication that the client application is
no longer interested in either sending or receiving data on a connection, can we improve
server throughput?
Note that we are aware of problems with not supporting half-closed connections. Dis-
abling support for all half-closed connections at the server will break clients that do rely
on half-closed semantics (i.e., they will be unable to receive data from the server follow-
ing a FIN)28. In current TCP implementations, clients do not provide any indication of
whether they are using half-closed semantics in their FIN segments, hence, the server TCP
stack cannot selectively disable half-closed connections from some clients. In this thesis,
we disable support for half-closed connections in order to assess if the throughput of an
overloaded server can be improved by avoiding the imprudent use of resources on connec-
tions that clients do not care about (i.e., connections which have been terminated through
a close() call without relying on half-closed semantics). We do not suggest that server
TCP stacks should stop supporting half-closed connections entirely. However, support for
half-closed connections could be disabled at the server on a per-application basis. That
is a server-side program could issue a setsockopt() system call to notify the TCP stack
that it should not support half-closed connections on any of its sockets29. Alternatively,
the TCP protocol could be enhanced to allow an end-point to notify its peer that it is not
using half-closed semantics while terminating a connection (e.g., through a special TCP
segment such as one with the FIN and RST flags both set). We perform experimental
evaluation in this thesis to determine whether such approaches are worth pursuing.
Assuming that most clients will not use half-closed connection semantics is not unrea-
sonable. Stevens [80] points out that most client applications (except for a few remote
shell implementations) use the close() system call instead of using half-closed connec-
tions. Zandy and Miller [90] describe a socket enhancement detection protocol that relies
partly on the fact that very few applications read() from half-closed connections following
a connection termination. All the modern web browsers that we are aware of do not use
half-closed semantics. Thus, most client applications will continue to work correctly after
the support for half-closed connections is disabled at the server TCP stack.
28Additional problems with not supporting half-closed connections are outlined in Section 4.2.2.
29 Specifically the listening socket and all the sockets derived from it, including those that refer to client
connections.
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We refer to our connection termination policy that does not support half-closed con-
nections as rst-fin30. Our current implementation of rst-syn disables support for all
half-closed connections in the server TCP stack. That is, we use a system-wide param-
eter configurable through the net.ipv4.tcp rst to fin sysctl to effect rst-fin, this
option was chosen for the ease of implementation. As alluded to earlier, we intend to
implement rst-fin as an application-specific option that can be configured through the
setsockopt() system call in the future. This would allow Internet servers fine-grained
control over support for half-closed connections by selecting rst-fin based on application
semantics.
When rst-fin is enabled all FIN segments that do not have piggy-backed data (i.e.,
a segment containing data along with a FIN flag) are assumed to indicate that the client
is interested in no further read or write activity on that connection, and the server TCP
stack takes steps to immediately stop work on that connection. To achieve this, it treats a
FIN from the client as if it were a RST, and throws away all information associated with
that connection. The server TCP stack then transmits a RST to the client. Note that the
transmission of RST in response to a FIN is done directly by the server’s TCP stack without
any intervention from the server application. The server application gets notification of the
terminated connection through a ECONNRESET error on a subsequent system call on that
socket. The handling of RST at the client is completely transparent to the application
(i.e., no information is propagated by the client TCP stack to the application), provided
the socket descriptor has been destroyed using a close() call. Figure 4.12(a) illustrates
how we disable support for half-closed connections.
Note that when rst-fin is enabled, the server TCP stack sends a RST in response
to a FIN instead of sending a FIN/ACK segment. This allow clients which are expecting
half-closed connection semantics (i.e., waiting for a read() following a shutdown()) to
be notified of an abnormal connection termination, instead of getting an EOF marker
indicating that the server has no more data to send. Sending a RST in our opinion, is
not only more correct, but it also frees the server from having to process a final ACK (in
response to the FIN sent) from the client. In this way, rst-fin can reduce the amount of
time the server spends processing TCP segments on connections that clients do not care
30An abbreviation of “RST to FIN”.
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about.
If there is data piggybacked with the FIN from a client, the server TCP stack does
not invoke rst-fin, but follows the usual connection teardown process that permits half-
closed connections. This is done to avoid penalizing client TCP stacks that implement
the connection termination optimization described by Nahum et al. [66] (summarized in
Section 2.2.2), and piggyback their last data segment on the FIN. Note also that when a
RST is sent in response to a FIN, the TCP connection transitions to the CLOSED state.
Hence, if this RST is lost in a WAN environment, the subsequent retransmission(s) of FIN
(when the FIN retransmission timeout expires) from the client will receive a RST from the
server TCP stack.
4.2.2 Connection Termination through Abortive Release
Some browsers such as Internet Explorer 5 and 6 terminate connections through an abortive
release [8]. An abortive release implies that the application notifies its TCP stack to
abruptly terminate a connection by sending a RST instead of using the two-way FIN/ACK
handshake31. The abortive release procedure is illustrated in Figure 4.12(b). Applications
typically use an abortive release in response to abnormal events, for example, when a
thread associated with the connection crashes.
We have observed that Internet Explorer uses an abortive release to terminate all of its
connections, whether they represent abnormal behaviour, for example, when the browser
window is closed by the user, or a routine event, for example, when the user hits the stop
button to stop loading a page or when the browser closes a connection due to a (browser-
based) timeout. Note that using an abortive release as part of the normal connection
termination process is against the recommendations of RFC 793 and RFC 2616. RFC
2616, which describes HTTP 1.1, states, – “When a client or server wishes to timeout it
should issue a graceful close on the transport connection” [32].
A RST from the client precludes support for half-closed connections because the server
TCP stack immediately throws away all information associated with that connection, and
subsequent system calls on that connection return ECONNRESET to the server application.
31An abortive release thus corresponds to the ABORT operation specified in RFC 793.
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(a) rst-fin Termination (b) Abortive Release (close-rst)
Figure 4.12: Alternatives to supporting half-closed connections
Many socket APIs provide an option to terminate connections through an abortive release.
In the BSD socket API, applications can activate the linger parameter in the SO LINGER
socket option with a zero timeout to force the subsequent close() call on that socket to
have the abortive release semantics.
The reasons why Internet Explorer terminates all connections in an abortive fashion
are not clear. The argument that doing so prevents servers from being stuck with a lot
of connections in TIME WAIT state (suggested in [8]) is incorrect because the connection
termination is initiated by the client. Only sides that initiate graceful connection termi-
nation have to transition to the TIME WAIT state. There are usually enough ephemeral
ports at the client to allow connections in TIME WAIT state, hence the client application
need not perform an abortive release when terminating a connection. A RST sent by the
client does bypass the CLOSE WAIT and LAST ACK TCP states shown in Figure 2.3 at the
server, allowing the server TCP stack to transition directly to the CLOSED state. As alluded
to earlier, it also ensures that the server application does not work on connections that
have been given up on by the clients. Since Internet Explorer is currently the most pop-
ular web browser (used by more than 75% of clients according to some estimates [8]), we
try to answer the following question – Does an abortive connection termination by client
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applications improve server throughput? We use the close-with-reset option provided
in httperf to emulate the abortive release behaviour of Internet Explorer. We believe
that ours is the first (public) attempt to study the impact of abortive release on server
throughput. We refer to the abortive release of a connection by a client application as
close-rst32.
It is important to note that both rst-fin and close-rst can result in lost data if
data segments arrive (out of order) on a connection after a FIN or RST, or if there is data
pending in the socket buffer that has not been read (or written) by the application when
a FIN or a RST is received on a connection. Both of these mechanisms treat a connection
termination notification from the client as an indication that the client does not care
about the connection, including the potential loss of TCP-acknowledged data that might
not have been delivered to the server application. Such an approach is acceptable given
the semantics of HTTP GET requests (which are the primary cause of overload in web
servers) or when clients terminate connections on a timeout. It might not be appropriate in
other application-level protocols or protocol primitives that require reliable delivery of data
sent prior to connection termination, and do not use application-level acknowledgements.
We reiterate that we take an exploratory approach toward studying the impact of TCP
connection termination mechanisms on server throughput, not a prescriptive one.
4.2.3 Evaluation of Alternative Connection Termination Mech-
anisms
Dropping support for half-closed connections only affects server throughput. The response
time, which is determined by how long it takes to establish a connection and for the
subsequent data transfers is not affected. Hence, we only include throughput results in
our evaluation of connection termination mechanisms. For completeness, we do include a
response-time graph toward the end of this section to demonstrate that it is not affected
by connection termination mechanisms.
Figure 4.13 shows the impact of rst-fin and close-rst when used in conjunction
with default. To study if there is a relationship between connection termination and







































Figure 4.13: Evaluation of alternative connection termination mechanisms
establishment mechanisms, in particular, to check if a particular connection termination
mechanism can obviate the need for better connection establishment mechanisms (or vice-
versa) – we also present the results of rst-fin and close-rst when used in combination
with abort rst-syn.
Figures 4.13(a) and 4.13(b) demonstrate that when compared to default, default
rst-fin results in a 17% improvement in the peak throughput with the µserver and 13%
improvement in peak throughput with TUX. Using rst-fin prevents resources from being
spent on processing connections that have been timed out by the client at the server. It
also allows the TCP connection state to transition directly from ESTABLISHED to CLOSED.
This frees the server from having to process additional ACK segments (in response to
FINs), including those on connections which were serviced successfully. For example, with
default in the µserver at 30,000 requests/sec, 1,659,594 out of the 6,638,376 total TCP
segments received after connection establishment represent a client acknowledgement of
the server’s FIN. The processing of these ACKs is avoided with abort rst-fin. For the
same reasons, default close-rst provides an improvement in throughput over default,
which is comparable (at and after the peak) to that obtained with default rst-fin in
both the µserver and TUX.
It is also evident that connection termination mechanisms complement connection es-
tablishment mechanisms. The throughput yielded by both rst-fin and close-rst in-
creases when they are coupled with abort rst-syn. The improvement in throughput
is especially significant in the µserver. As shown in Figure 4.13(a), when compared to
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default rst-fin, abort rst-syn rst-fin provides more than 20% higher throughput
(after peak), and abort rst-syn close-rst provides close to 30% higher throughput.
Note that with abort rst-syn close-rst, the server is able to stop working on a con-
nection upon receiving a RST from a client without having to transmit any subsequent
TCP segments. On the other hand, with abort rst-syn rst-fin, the server TCP stack
has to transmit an additional RST after receiving a client FIN. The increase in through-
put in TUX obtained with rst-fin and close-rst when used in conjunction with abort
rst-syn is comparatively smaller (around 5%).
The results of this section suggest that stopping work on connections immediately after
they have been terminated by clients can improve the throughput of an overloaded server.
The server can stop working on terminated connections by disabling support for half-closed
TCP connections (on a per-application basis), or if “cooperative” clients use an abortive
release for tearing down connections. Alternatively, existing event notification mechanisms
can be enhanced to notify a server application of a connection terminated by a client before
it makes further system calls on the socket associated with that connection, for example,
by adding a POLL FIN bit to the poll() system call. The server application could then
choose to terminate the client connection immediately, dropping support for half-closed
connections in the process.
Emulation of Typical Web Clients
In this section, we review the impact of different connection management mechanisms on
the performance of overload servers when used with typical (as of 2005) web clients –
Internet Explorer browsers running on Microsoft Windows operating systems [8]. That is,
we use Linux clients that emulate the win-syn-retry behaviour (i.e., win-emu clients)
along with httperf configured to terminate connections using an abortive release (i.e.,
close-rst). These typical web clients will be denoted as close-rst win-emu in the
following discussion.
We evaluate the following connection establishment mechanisms with typical web clients –
abort, which is implemented in most UNIX TCP stacks (and is a configurable option in
Linux), abort rst-syn, which is used in some Windows TCP stacks, and no-syn-drop,









































abort rst-syn close-rst win-emu
no-syn-drop close-rst win-emu
(b) Response Time
Figure 4.14: Evaluation of the µserver with typical web clients
used to work around win-syn-retry clients. We only include the results obtained with
the µserver in Figure 4.14, the results obtained with TUX are similar.
As alluded to earlier, the connection termination mechanism used does not affect the
response times. The results of abort close-rst win-emu in Figure 4.14(b) are compa-
rable to those of abort win-emu in Figure 4.10(b). By eliminating the retransmission
of connection establishment segments, abort rst-syn and no-syn-drop provide two or-
ders of magnitude reduction in response times compared to abort. The throughput of
abort rst-syn is lower with typical web clients due to the overhead of handling SYN seg-
ments retried by win-syn-retry TCP stacks. As described in Section 4.1.6, by preventing
the TCP-level retransmission of connection attempts by clients, no-syn-drop can provide
more than a 20% increase in throughput (after the peak) compared to abort on typical
web clients.
In summary, mechanisms that avoid the retransmission of connection attempts from
client TCP stacks can improve server throughput and reduce client response times under
overload. Unfortunately, win-syn-retry client TCP stacks, which do not follow the rec-
ommendations of RFC 793 with respect to handling of a RST received in response to a SYN,
can nullify the effectiveness of rst-syn. However, no-syn-drop can be used in such cases
to improve server throughput by up to 40% and reduce client response times by two orders
of magnitude. Note that although its approach might be ungainly, no-syn-drop works
equally well with regular as well as win-syn-retry clients. We have also demonstrated
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that disabling support for half-closed connections and the abortive release of connections
by client applications can improve the throughput of an overload server by more than 15%.
In the next chapter, we will revisit some of these connection management mechanisms and





In this chapter, we evaluate some of the connection management mechanisms described
in Chapter 4 under different environments. For the experiments presented in Chapter 4,
we used a single workload (namely, the one-packet workload) to effect persistent overload
with a 10 second client timeout on a Xeon (x86) machine running Linux 2.4.22 as our
server. In this chapter, we examine whether the implementation choices for connection
management, especially connection establishment, continue to have an impact on server
throughput and client response times when used with different workloads, bursty traffic,
different client timeouts, early packet drops, and different platforms. Note that for clarity,
we only modify one parameter at a time in each of the following sections.
For brevity, we only present results of the µserver on regular clients in this chapter.
The TUX results are qualitatively similar and do not provide additional insight. Also, as
demonstrated in Section 4.1.6, the no-syn-drop mechanism can be used to achieve the
effect of rst-syn on Windows-like (win-syn-retry) clients. Thus, in this chapter we focus
on presenting the throughput and response time results obtained with the µserver under
different environments. The analysis of the results with different connection management
mechanisms (using supporting metrics such as error rate and queue drops) was provided
in Chapter 4, we will not repeat that discussion in this chapter.
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5.1 SPECweb99-like Workloads
In this section, we present the results of connection management mechanisms on the in-
memory, SPECweb99-like workloads. As described in Section 3.2.2, we use three SPECweb-
99-like workloads, which differ in the average number of requests per connection. The
single-request-per-connection (referred to as “1 req/conn”) workload extends the one-
packet workload with variable-sized file transfers. The 7.2-requests-per-connection (re-
ferred to as “7.2 req/conn”) workload uses the SPECweb99-stipulated 7.2 average requests
per connections. The 2.62-requests-per-connection (referred to as “2.62 req/conn) work-
load uses an average of 2.62 requests per connection to mimic the behaviour of current web
browsers, particularly Internet Explorer.
In Figure 5.1, we compare the throughput and response times obtained with abort
rst-syn to that obtained with default on the three SPECweb99-like workloads. Recall
that abort rst-syn seeks to eliminate the retransmission of SYN segments by client TCP
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abort rst-syn 1 req/conn
default 2.62 req/conn
abort rst-syn 2.62 req/conn
default 7.2 req/conn
abort rst-syn 7.2 req/conn
(b) Response Time
Figure 5.1: Evaluation of connection establishment mechanisms with the µserver on
SPECweb99-like workloads
Figure 5.1(a) shows that abort rst-syn does not improve upon the throughput of
default on the “7.2 req/conn” workload. This is not surprising, given that this workload
does not aggressively create new connections. Even when the target request rate is 30,000
requests/sec, the rate of new connections is substantially smaller (only around 3,900 con-
nections/sec). As a result, the implementation choices for connection establishment do not
have a significant impact on server throughput. However, the response time with abort
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rst-syn is significantly (around 80%) lower than that obtained with default, in spite of
the fact that the “7.2 req/conn” workload contains multiple file transfers with an average
transfer size of 15 KB. That is, the transfer time for this workload is not negligible, yet
the higher overall response time with default indicates that the transfer time is a small
fraction of the connection establishment time. Thus, during overload the connection es-
tablishment time dominates the overall response time. Note that the reduction in response
time is not because fewer clients are serviced. The error rate with abort rst-syn is in
fact slightly lower than that with default, as explained in Section 4.1.6.
On the connection-oriented “1 req/conn” workload, abort rst-syn provides more than
a 20% improvement in throughput after the peak and two orders of magnitude reduction
in response time when compared with default. These differences are similar to those
reported for the one-packet workload in Section 4.1.6, which indicates that the connection-
oriented nature of these workloads dominates the amount of content transferred.
Finally for the “2.62 req/conn” workload, with abort rst-syn, the throughput after
the peak is around 10% higher and the response time is two orders of magnitude lower when
compared with default. As described in Section 3.2.2, while SPECweb99 incorporates
many aspects of the workloads seen in production web sites, it overestimates the number
of requests per connection issued by modern browsers. These results clearly indicate that
the impact of the connection establishment mechanisms on the server throughput depends
on the rate of new connections at the server. At the same time, mechanisms such as abort
rst-syn provide a substantial reduction in client response times even on workloads that
are not connection-oriented.
In order to evaluate whether immediately stopping work on connections that have been
terminated by clients can improve server throughput on the SPECweb99-like workloads,
we present the results of default and default close-rst in Figure 5.2. Note that the
throughput obtained with default rst-fin was similar to that obtained with default
close-rst, but we leave out its results from Figure 5.2 for clarity.
The difference in the throughput obtained with default close-rst and default
is negligible for the “7.2 req/conn” workload, as expected, because this workload does
not stress the connection management mechanisms of the server. By ensuring that the


















default close-rst 1 req/conn
default 2.62 req/conn
default close-rst 2.62 req/conn
default 7.2 req/conn
default close-rst 7.2 req/conn
Figure 5.2: Evaluation of connection termination mechanisms with the µserver on
SPECweb99-like workloads
close-rst can provide around an 8% improvement in throughput after the peak on the
“2.62 req/conn” workload, and an 11% increase in throughput on the “1 req/conn” work-
load.
The results in this section indicate that given current browser and TCP stack implemen-
tations, connection establishment mechanisms such as abort rst-syn, which prevent the
TCP-level retransmission of connection attempts from clients, significantly reduce client
response times and increase the throughput of web servers during overload, without requir-
ing any additional effort on the part of web site administrators1. Additionally, an abortive
release of connections by client applications (as well as disabling support for half-close
connections at the server TCP stack) can result up to 10% improvement in the throughput
of an overloaded server.
5.2 Bursty Traffic
We use persistent overload (described in Section 3.2.4) in our evaluation of connection
management mechanisms in this thesis because it is representative of the load handled by
real-world servers during flash crowds. During persistent overload, most of the retrans-
1Other than turning on the sysctls that enable these mechanisms, if they are not on by default.
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mission of connection establishment attempts by the client TCP stacks occur while the
server is still under overload. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, under persistent overload,
connection establishment mechanisms such as abort rst-syn and no-syn-drop increase
server throughput and reduce client response times by notifying client TCP stacks to elim-
inate the retransmission of connection attempts. In this section, we conduct a preliminary
investigation of the performance of such mechanisms under bursty traffic. Under bursty
traffic, overload conditions at the server are transient, with short-lived bursts of heavy
traffic (overload bursts) interrupting protracted periods of light load. Unlike persistent
overload, the duration of the bursts is short enough that the overload has subsided by the
time the majority of clients retransmit their SYNs.
We stress that the results presented in this section are preliminary. It might be possible
to size the SYN and listen queues to avoid queue drops during bursty traffic. Recall that
the implementation choices for connection establishment come into play only when there
are queue drops. We are in the process of developing a mathematical model for sizing
these queues so as to minimize the number of queue drops. In this section, we use a simple
method for generating bursts that allows us to compare the behaviour of abort rst-syn
and default under bursty traffic with the default sizes for the SYN and listen queues
(which were also used in all other experiments).
Figure 5.3 illustrates our simple approach for generating bursty traffic. It consists
of two alternating phases – an overload burst that lasts for b seconds where the server
receives sustained connection attempts at a rate of R’ requests per second, and an inactivity
period, where the server receives no client connections2 for 5 seconds. Although in general
inactivity periods can be variable length, we assume a fixed 5 second inactivity period to
simplify our analysis. The server can handle some connections “left over” from the burst
(especially those connections which are initiated toward the end of the burst), if they are
retried by the clients during the inactivity period. By using an inactivity period instead
of a period of light load, our model recreates a worst-case scenario for mechanisms such
as abort rst-syn, which abort client connection attempts immediately during overload
(i.e., whenever queue drops occur), even though the server might in a position to handle
2Unfortunately, our workload generator does not support the creation of no connections, so we had to















Figure 5.3: A simple approach for generating bursty traffic
them later.
We use three different burst lengths – 10 seconds (denoted “10s-burst”), 20 seconds
(denoted “20s-burst”), and 40 seconds (denoted “40s-burst”) to study how the duration of
the overload burst relative to the inactivity period affects server throughput and response
time. Note that each data point for the experiments in this section was run for 225 seconds
to ensure that the number of bursts and inactivity periods is evenly balanced3. We also use
a request rate (R’) during the burst to ensure that the average request rate achieved for a
particular data point matches the target rate (R) specified to httperf. For example, with
a 10 second burst length and a 5-second inactivity period, to achieve an overall target rate
of 10,000 requests/sec, a net rate of 15,000 request/sec is used during the burst. Without
an increase in the rate during the burst, the average request rate achieved would be much
lower because requests are suppressed during the inactivity period. The results comparing
abort rst-syn and default for the three burst lengths appear in Figure 5.4
As alluded to earlier for the 10 second burst, Figure 5.4(a) shows that abort rst-syn
results in around 25% lower throughput compared to default. By aborting connections
every time there is a queue drop, abort rst-syn is able to reduce the queue drop rate
as well as the response times (shown in Figures 5.4(d) and 5.4(b)). However, as shown in
Figure 5.4(c), this reduction comes at the cost of a higher error rate because connections































































































Figure 5.4: Evaluation of the µserver under bursty traffic
are aborted immediately on a queue drop, so overall fewer clients get serviced with abort
rst-syn for the 10 second burst workload. On the other hand, with default, clients whose
initial SYN segments are dropped can get a response from the server on a subsequent SYN
retransmission, especially if it occurs during an inactivity period at the server. Note
that with a 10 second burst and a 5 second inactivity period, the probability of SYN
retransmissions occurring during an inactivity period is high.
Interestingly, as the burst length increases to 20 seconds, the difference in throughput
between abort rst-syn and default becomes negligible. With a 40 second burst, the
throughput of abort rst-syn is higher than that of default, which is similar to what
we observed under persistent overload. As the burst length is increased relative to the
length of the inactivity period, most of the client retransmissions with default happen
not during an inactivity period, but while the server is still overloaded, thereby lowering
the server throughput. The response time obtained with abort rst-syn is two orders of
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magnitude lower than that obtained with default for all the three burst lengths. Note
that the reduction in response time is not due to an increase in the error rate.
Using a 10 second inactivity period with the same three burst-lengths did not lead to
a significant change in the throughput or the response time (for both abort rst-syn and
default) when compared with the results shown in Figure 5.4. This section demonstrates
that there is a crossover point with respect to how long an overload burst lasts relative to
the length of the inactivity period, after which connection establishment mechanisms such
as abort rst-syn perform as well as or better than default in terms of server throughput.
Note that the client response times are significantly lower when abort rst-syn is used
instead of default, irrespective of the length of the burst. The discussion in this section
also applies to the no-syn-drop mechanism, which aborts client connection attempts at
the ACK stage instead of the SYN stage as done in rst-syn. Both these mechanisms can
result in suboptimal throughput during short-lived bursty traffic when client applications
(or end users) do not retry a connection immediately upon receiving an explicit failure
notification from the server.
In this section, we used a simple model of bursty traffic along with a fixed-length
inactivity period. In the future, we intend to perform a more rigorous analysis to determine
exactly where this crossover point lies for variable-length, variable-rate periods of overload
and light load. Dynamic techniques can then be used to detect persistent overload and
notify some client TCP stacks to stop the retransmission of connection attempts. One
such simple dynamic technique that addresses both bursty traffic and persistent overload
is described below. The server TCP stack assumes short-lived bursty traffic when queue
drops first occur. It checks periodically if queue drops continue to occur for t seconds. If
queue drops do last for t seconds, persistent overload is detected and the TCP stack notifies
clients to stop the retransmission of connection attempts. Although the server throughput
with this mechanism will be slightly lower at the start of the persistent overload period,
the server is not adversely affected by bursty traffic. The value of t can be determined
analytically (based on the crossover point) or empirically using traces from flash crowds.
We believe that the automatic detection of persistent overload can form the basis of
interesting research in the future. Note that the mechanisms discussed in this thesis do
not have an impact on server behaviour under light loads. Mechanisms such as abort
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rst-syn or no-syn-drop provide a significant improvement in throughput during persis-
tent overload. However, these mechanisms might result in suboptimal throughput during
short-lived bursts of heavy traffic, techniques to automatically detect persistent overload
can help eliminate this limitation. Both abort rst-syn and no-syn-drop provide more
than an order of magnitude reduction in client response times during bursty traffic as well
as under persistent overload. We believe that the results reported in this thesis make a
strong case for deploying mechanisms that notify clients to stop the TCP-level retransmis-
sion of connection attempts in production TCP stacks.
5.3 Different Client Timeouts
For all of our experiments in this thesis we use a 10 second client timeout as explained in
Section 3.2.3. That is, if the client application (httperf) does not receive a SYN/ACK or
a response to its request from the server within 10 seconds, it gives up on its connection,
marking it as an error. The client application typically times out because it does not receive
a SYN/ACK in response to its SYN. The timeout in turn influences the total number of
SYN transmissions by the client TCP stack. As shown in Figure 4.5, the Linux TCP stack
retransmits SYN segments five times for up to 93 seconds after a client application issues a
connect() system call (if no SYN/ACK is received for any of the SYN transmissions). A
timeout of 10 seconds allows for at most three SYN transmissions, including retransmissions
3 and 9 seconds after the original transmission. This is similar to the behaviour of TCP
stacks in Windows 2000 and XP.
In this section, we study the impact of using different timeout values on the throughput
and the client response times when the server is under overload. We use the following
timeout values for our experiments – 1 second, 4 seconds, 10 seconds, and 22 seconds.
These values have been chosen to allow for one second after the transmission of the first, the
second, the third, and the fourth SYN respectively (in Linux), after which the client gives
up on the connection if it does not receive a server response. In Figure 5.5, we compare
the throughput and the response time obtained with abort rst-syn to that obtained
with default with these four timeout values. Note that using a 22 second timeout we




















































Figure 5.5: Evaluation of the µserver with different client timeouts
machines because the clients ran out of ephemeral ports. For this reason, data points
after 28,000 requests/sec are missing for the default results with the 22 second timeout
in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5(a) demonstrates that as the timeout increases, the throughput provided by
default decreases. In contrast, the throughput with abort rst-syn is not affected by
the timeout value because no SYN retransmissions are permitted. The improvement in
throughput after the peak with abort rst-syn in comparison to default is close to 20%
with a 4 second timeout, more than 27% with a 10 second timeout, and more than 35%
with a 22 second timeout. The throughput as well as the response time obtained with
default is similar to that obtained with abort rst-syn with a 1 second timeout because
there are no SYN retransmissions.
As shown in Figure 5.5(b), the response times obtained with abort rst-syn are two
orders of magnitude lower than that obtained with default for timeout values over 1
second. This is because clients can get service on later SYN retransmissions with default.
Note that we could increase the gap in the response times between abort rst-syn and
default even further (i.e., to three orders of magnitude) simply by using a larger timeout
(e.g., 46 seconds).
The results in this section demonstrate that as the timeout value used by client appli-
cations or users increases, the improvement in throughput and response times provided by
connection establishment mechanisms such as abort rst-syn (which prevents the TCP-
level retransmissions of connection attempts) increases as well.
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5.4 Early SYN Drops
In this section we describe a mechanism that allows an early discard of client connection
establishment packets under overload anywhere in the networking stack. This mechanism
relies only on existing data structures available in the Linux TCP stack, in particular, it
only uses the listen and SYN queues. Unlike previous work by Voigt et al. [85] or Iyer et
al. [40], no external admission control technique is required. We refer to our mechanism as
early-syn-drop.
Researchers have advocated dropping packets as early as possible in the networking
stack in order to minimize the resources spent on dropped packets [63]. In this section,
we demonstrate that dropping SYN segments earlier in the networking stack does not
significantly reduce their negative impact on server throughput. That is, the high overhead
of processing SYN segments during high loads is not an artifact of a poor implementation
of TCP connection establishment in Linux. In the process, we point out that techniques
such as persistent dropping [45] that seek to filter our retransmitted SYN segments with a
lower overhead are unlikely to succeed in improving server throughput.
Figure 5.6 outlines the code path4 taken by a TCP SYN segment in the NAPI-enabled
Linux networking stack. The packet is first processed by the driver and then by a NAPI-
based kernel thread when it is received. An skbuff encapsulating the packet is created, and
it is passed on to the IP layer for processing. Note that Figure 5.6 shows the code path for
IPv4, however, the code path for IPv6 is similar. A packet destined for the local machine is
then passed on to the TCP layer for further processing. The tcp v4 rcv function (line 13)
serves as an entry point into the TCP layer from the IP layer, while tcp v4 conn request
(line 25) implements the bulk of the SYN processing, including dropping SYN segments or
responding with a SYN/ACK. As seen in Figure 5.6, multiple procedures (many of which
are inlined hash table lookups) need to be invoked at the TCP layer before a SYN can be
processed.
We now describe how early-syn-drop is implemented. A SYN segment is normally
dropped whenever the SynQ3/4Full or ListenQFullAtSyn rules are triggered. However,
as indicated in Section 4.1.3, when abort is used in our environment, SYN segments are
4In the figure, indentation distinguishes called functions from the callee, and all function at the same
level of indentation in a particular component occur in sequence.
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[Device Driver / Software Interrupt]
(1) e1000_intr (interrupt handler)
(2) netif_rx_schedule (schedules software interrupt)
[software interrupt scheduling code omitted]
(3) net_rx_action (run when software interrupt is scheduled)
(4) e1000_clean (dev->poll)
(5) e1000_clean_rx_irq
(6) [NAPI accounting code omitted]
(7) netif_receive_skb (calls ip_rcv)
[IP]
(8) ip_rcv
(9) nf_hook (netfilter hook, disabled in our configuration)
(10) ip_rcv_finish
(11) ip_local_deliver







(18) tcp_v4_rcv_established (fast path for ESTABLISHED sockets)
(19) tcp_v4_hnd_req (otherwise)
(20) tcp_v4_search_req
(21) tcp_v4_check_req (req found, try to transition from SYN_RECV to ESTAB.)
(22) tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock (fails if listen queue is full)
(23) __tcp_v4_lookup_established (if req not found)
(24) tcp_rcv_state_process
(25) tcp_v4_conn_request (for LISTEN sockets, process SYN, try to send SYN/ACK)
Figure 5.6: TCP connection establishment code path in Linux with NAPI
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dropped only because the listen queue is full5. Hence, as long as the listen queue is full6,
SYN segments can be dropped earlier in the networking stack. Whenever a SYN or a
SYN/ACK ACK is dropped due to ListenQFullAtSyn or ListenQOverflow, a flag is set.
It is unset whenever space is created in the listen queue following an accept() call. This
flag is visible across the various layers in the networking subsystem and when set, earlier
methods can drop SYN segments without passing them on to subsequent functions (i.e.,
higher up the networking stack). The early-syn-drop mechanism thus provides basic
admission control functionality that relies only on the listen queue data structure in the
TCP stack. By enforcing packet drops only when queue drops occur, early-syn-drop
ensures that the server is never under-utilized during overload.
The flag indicating that SYNs can be dropped is visible throughout the networking
subsystem allowing early-syn-drop to be enforced at various stages in the network packet
processing. We have explored two such options – at the entry point of the TCP layer (i.e.,
in the tcp v4 rcv function (line 13)), and at the entry point of the IP layer (i.e., in the
ip rcv function (line 8)). Dropping SYN segments at the entry point of the TCP layer
obviates the need for hash table lookups when the listen queue is full. Similarly, dropping
SYN segments at the entry point of the IP layer reduces the resources spent on dropped
packets in further IP and TCP processing. Note that some packet filters and firewalls (e.g.,
netfilter) use hooks at the entry point of the IP layer to enforce dropping of packets.
While we did not use a generic packet filter because of the high overhead involved, we
added code at various stages in the networking stack to drop SYN segments by examining
the flags field in the TCP headers. We did not observe a significant difference in server
throughput (or response time) between the implementation of early-syn-drop at the
entry point of the IP layer and that at the TCP layer. In this section, we will present
the results of early-syn-drop implemented at the entry point of the TCP layer because
this approach preserves protocol layering. Note that it might be possible to implement
early-syn-drop in the driver allowing certain packets to be dropped even before they are
pulled off the network card. To our knowledge, the e1000 driver used in our evaluation
does not support selective packet drops on the network card. We intend to explore the
5Queue drops due to the SYN queue being full can also be avoided by using SYN cookies.
6It would be trivial to add a rule to enforce early drops when the SYN queue is full.
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possibility of enforcing early-syn-drop directly at the network card in the future.
It is possible to use early-syn-drop in conjunction with other connection establish-
ment mechanisms. In fact, we can use the early-syn-drop mechanism in combination
with default or any of the connection establishment alternatives shown in Figure 4.1.
To isolate the impact of early-syn-drop, we present the results of abort and abort
rst-syn when used with and without early-syn-drop in Figure 5.7. While abort
early-syn-drop implies a silent, but early drop of SYN segments, with abort rst-syn
early-syn-drop, whenever SYN segments are dropped early, a RST is sent to the clients.
Note that abort rst-syn (without any early SYN drops) serves as a yardstick to measure











































Figure 5.7: Evaluation of the µserver with early SYN drops
Figure 5.7(a) shows that early-syn-drop fails to yield a substantial improvement in
throughput. The increase in throughput over abort with abort early-syn-drop is less
than 5%, and nowhere as significant as the improvement provided by abort rst-syn. In
fact, even abort rst-syn early-syn-drop fails to yield more than a 5% improvement
in throughput over abort rst-syn. We treat all received SYN segments uniformly, ir-
respective of whether they are retransmitted or not. Hence, as shown in Figure 5.7(b),
our implementation of early-syn-drop cannot reduce the client response time, which is
influenced by retransmitted SYN segments.
Note that early-syn-drop is effective in dropping SYNs early when the listen queue
is full. For example, at 30,000 requests/sec, with abort early-syn-drop, 4,979,497 out
of the 7,610,976 SYN segments received are dropped, out of which 4,968,015 SYNs are
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dropped early, and only 11,482 SYNs are dropped through the normal SYN-processing
code path7.
Thus, the early-syn-drop mechanism is effective in ensuring that SYN segments are
dropped early in the networking stack during server overload. However, an early drop fails
to reduce the overhead of processing SYN segments. Consequently, it does not improve
server throughput under overload compared to mechanisms that explicitly notify clients to
stop the TCP-level retransmission of connection attempts. In light of the results in this
section, we expect that mechanisms such as rst-syn and no-syn-drop will provide better
server throughput during flash crowds compared to approaches like persistent dropping [45],
which require SYN segments to be processed at the server before they are dropped. We
intend to determine if this is the case in future work.
5.5 Different Hardware Platforms and TCP Stacks
We use a Xeon (x86) machine running a Linux 2.4.22 kernel as the server in all of our
experiments. In this section, we revisit some of the TCP connection establishment and ter-
mination mechanisms described in Chapter 4, evaluating their performance on a Itanium-2
(ia64) server machine that runs a current Linux 2.6.11 kernel. We show that the results of
the connection management mechanisms presented in this thesis are not sensitive to the
hardware platform used for their evaluation.
The Itanium-2 is a 64-bit architecture that uses features such as an explicitly parallel
instruction set that make it very different from the 32-bit x86 architecture. As described
in Section 3.1.2, the Itanium-2 server used for the experiments in this section also has
a larger cache and main memory compared to the x86 machine used in the rest of our
experiments. Recall also that the implementation of connection management in the Linux
2.6 TCP stack (as of the current version, 2.6.11.6) has not changed from that in the 2.4
stack. In Figure 5.8, we present the throughput and response time results for default,
abort, abort rst-syn, and abort rst-syn rst-fin.
The results shown in Figure 5.8 are qualitatively similar to those presented in Chapter 4.
















































Figure 5.8: Evaluation of the µserver on an Itanium-2 server and a Linux 2.6 kernel
Using abort fails to provide a substantial improvement in the throughput or the response
time over default due to the overhead of processing retransmitted SYN segments. With
abort rst-syn, there is close to a 15% improvement in throughput after the peak, and
nearly two orders of magnitude reduction in client response times, when compared with
abort and default. Using rst-fin in conjunction with abort rst-syn results in 30%
higher throughput after the peak compared to default.
Note that in absolute terms, the results of all the connection management mechanisms
(including default) are worse on the Itanium-2 server than those on the Xeon server. In
particular, the peak throughput is 38% lower. We believe that is because the design and
implementation of efficient compilers and kernel subsystems on the Itanium architecture
is still under active development. However, the results of the connection management
mechanisms are qualitatively similar to those on the Xeon server used in the rest of our
experiments. Thus, the results reported in this thesis are not an artifact of the server
hardware platform or the version of the (Linux) TCP stack used in the experiments.
The results presented in this Chapter reaffirm the fact that the implementation choices
for TCP connection management studied in this thesis can have a significant impact on
server throughput and client response times in a variety of environments. We hope that our
work can assist application developers, system administrators, and protocol implementers





In this thesis, we provide a better understanding of the behaviour of an overloaded server.
In particular, we describe some of the causes of the drop in server throughput and the
increase in client response times as the load at the server increases. After studying sev-
eral different connection management mechanisms, we demonstrate that implementation
choices for TCP connection establishment and termination can have a significant impact
on server throughput and client response times during overload conditions such as flash
crowds.
We review the existing approaches for implementing connection establishment in TCP
stacks in Linux, various flavours of UNIX, and Windows. We point out a shortcoming
in the default Linux implementation of connection establishment (default). The silent
drop of SYN/ACK ACK segments from clients when the listen queue overflows at an
overloaded server can cause a disconnect between the TCP states at the clients and the
server, resulting in unnecessary traffic at the server as well as in the network. TCP stacks
in UNIX and Windows implement the abort mechanism to prevent this disconnect by
sending a reset (RST) to clients whose SYN/ACK ACK segments are dropped. The Linux
TCP stack should similarly enable abort by default. Although proactive mechanisms such
as listen queue reservation (reserv) can be used avoid listen queue overflows, they are more
vulnerable to SYN flood denial of service attacks in the current Internet infrastructure.
We show that mechanisms implemented at the server TCP stack, which eliminate the
TCP-level retransmission of connection attempts by clients during overload, can improve
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server throughput by up to 40% and reduce client response times by two orders of magni-
tude in a variety of operating environments. Unfortunately, a mechanism such as rst-syn,
which sends RST to clients whose SYN segments are dropped, cannot be effectively de-
ployed because some client TCP stacks, notably those on Windows operating systems, do
not follow RFC 793 and instead retry a SYN immediately upon receiving a RST from the
server for a previous SYN. We describe a mechanism called no-syn-drop that prevents the
retransmission of connection attempts even in Windows-like TCP stacks. In no-syn-drop,
no SYN segments are dropped, instead the server TCP stack uses abort to reset connec-
tions from clients whose SYN/ACK ACKs cannot be accommodated in the listen queue.
While the no-syn-drop approach is ungainly, it requires no modifications to client-side
TCP stacks and applications, or server-side applications.
We believe that the results reported in this thesis make a strong case for TCP stack
implementors to develop a clean mechanism to allow an overloaded server to explicitly
notify clients to stop the retransmission of SYN segments. A silent drop of SYN segments
as suggested in RFC 3360 [34] is harmful to Internet server throughput and client response
time during persistent overload conditions such as flash crowds. Such an overload notifi-
cation mechanism might be ICMP-based [44], it could leverage the text-based extensions
suggested in RFC 793 to describe the cause of a TCP RST, or it could use a specially
crafted TCP segment (e.g., a segment with the SYN, ACK, and FIN flags set)1. The
client TCP stack can propagate this notification to the application through an appropriate
socket-level error message such as ESERVEROVRLD.
We demonstrate that supporting half-closed TCP connections can lead to an impru-
dent use of resources at an overloaded server when client applications terminate connections
using the half-duplex semantics offered by the close() system call. We describe a mech-
anism called rst-fin that disables support for half-closed connections at the server TCP
stack. We also examine whether client applications that terminate connections using an
abortive release (such as Internet Explorer) affect server throughput. Our results indicate
that both an abortive release and rst-fin improve server throughput by 10%-15% on
most workloads. While typical web transactions (i.e., HTTP GET requests) can operate
1A specially crafted segment can allow a client which receives a RST to distinguish between server
overload and the lack of listening socket at the requested port.
109
with the relaxed data-delivery guarantees entailed by an abortive connection release or
rst-fin, this trade-off between strict reliability and higher throughput might not be ac-
ceptable for all application protocols. Instead of clients terminating connections abortively,
an application-specific socket option could be implemented to allow server applications to
select the rst-fin approach based on application protocol semantics.
6.1 Future Work
In the future, we intend to conduct a detailed study of the impact of TCP connection estab-
lishment mechanisms on server throughput under short-lived bursty traffic. In particular,
we plan to investigate exactly how long a burst needs to last before it can be treated
as persistent overload and examine whether the SYN and listen queues can be sized to
minimize queue drops during short-lived bursts. We also intend to explore techniques to
distinguish bursty traffic from persistent overload conditions so that the server can notify
clients to stop the retransmission of connection attempts only when those retransmissions
are likely to occur while the server is still under overload.
Additionally, we plan to examine the impact of TCP connection management mecha-
nisms on server throughput and client response times under wide-area network conditions,
using tools such as NIST Net [20] to simulate wide-area traffic characteristics such as
delays and packet loss. We also intend to reevaluate the performance of the connection
management mechanisms discussed in this thesis with specialized TCP stacks, such as those
offloaded on to the network card or those implemented on dedicated packet-processing CPU
cores, when such stacks become widely available. Furthermore, it would be instructive to
assess the impact of the mechanisms studied in this thesis on dynamic-content workloads.
Finally, the results reported in this thesis indicate that it is possible to sustain tens of
millions of hits per hour using an out-of-the-box server in our environment. This suggests
that a well-designed user-space web server with a modified TCP stack running Linux on a
uniprocessor commodity Xeon machine can provide good performance under overload. We
intend to evaluate whether these developments obviate the need for maintaining elaborate




abort: Connection establishment mechanism that aborts a client connection with a RST
when ListenQOverFlow is triggered upon receiving a SYN/ACK ACK. Implemented
in TCP stacks in FreeBSD, HP-UX, Solaris and Windows. Implemented but not
enabled by default in the Linux TCP stack.
abort early-syn-drop: Connection establishment mechanism that aborts a client con-
nection with a RST whenever a SYN/ACK ACK is dropped and effects an early drop
of SYNs while the server is overloaded. See also early-syn-drop.
abort rst-syn: Connection establishment mechanism that aborts a client connection with
a RST whenever a SYN/ACK ACK or a SYN is dropped (due to ListenQOverflow,
SynQ3/4Full, or ListenQFullAtSyn).
abort rst-syn early-syn-drop: Connection establishment mechanism that aborts a
client connection with a RST whenever a SYN/ACK ACK or a SYN is dropped.
Note that SYNs are dropped early while the server is overloaded. See also early-syn-
drop.
abort rst-syn close-rst: Connection management mechanism that uses abort rst-syn
for connection establishment with clients that terminate their connections using an
abortive release (close-rst).
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abort rst-syn rst-fin: Connection management mechanism that uses abort rst-syn
for connection establishment in conjunction with rst-fin for connection termination
(which disables support for half-closed TCP connections at the server).
abort rst-syn win-emu: Connection establishment mechanism that uses abort rst-syn
when dealing with win-emu clients, which retry a SYN upon receiving a RST for a
previous SYN.
ACK stage: The second step in the three-way TCP connection establishment handshake
concerned with the processing of a SYN/ACK ACK. See also SYN stage.
client TCP stack: The client-side functionality provided by the TCP stack in an oper-
ating system.
close-rst: An abortive release of a connection, where the client application forces its
TCP stack to terminate a connection by sending a RST. Implemented by Internet
Explorer 5 and 6.
default: The default connection establishment mechanism in the Linux TCP stack (im-
plemented in the 2.4 and the current 2.6 kernel, as of 2.6.11.6), which silently drops
SYN segments (due to SynQ3/4Full or ListenQFullAtSyn) as well as SYN/ACK ACK
segments (due to ListenQOverflow).
early-syn-drop: A mechanism that allows an early drop of SYN segments anywhere in
the networking stack while the connection establishment queues are full due to server
overload.
ListenQFullAtSyn: A rule dictating that a SYN segment be dropped because the listen
queue is full. Enforced at the SYN stage. See also ListenQOverflow and SynQ3/4Full.
ListenQOverflow: A rule dictating that a SYN/ACK ACK segment be dropped be-
cause there is no space in the listen queue. Enforced at the ACK stage. See also
ListenQFullAtSyn and SynQ3/4Full.
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no-syn-drop Connection establishment mechanism that does not drop any SYN seg-
ments, but relies on abort to reject client connections on ListenQOverflow-induced
SYN/ACK ACK drops.
queue drop: A SYN or SYN/ACK ACK segment that cannot be accommodated in the
SYN or the listen queue and has to be dropped.
regular clients: TCP stacks which give up on a connection upon receiving a RST
in response to a SYN and indicate an error to the application, thus following the
recommendations of RFC 793. See also win-syn-retry.
reserv: Connection establishment mechanism that implements listen queue reservation
at the SYN stage.
reserv rst-syn: Connection establishment mechanism that sends a RST in response to
a SYN whenever a reservation cannot be made in the listen queue.
rst-fin: Connection termination mechanism that disables support for half-closed TCP
connections at the server. All FIN segments are assumed to indicate that a client
is not interested in further read or write activity on a connection, hence, the server
sends a RST in response to a client’s FIN.
rst-syn: Connection establishment mechanism that sends a RST to a client whenever a
SYN segment is dropped. Implemented in some Windows TCP stacks.
server TCP stack: The server-side functionality provided by the TCP stack in an
operating system.
SYN/ACK ACK: A TCP segment used by the client to acknowledge that it has received
the SYN/ACK sent by the server.
SYN drop: A silent drop of a SYN segment without any client notification, as imple-
mented in most UNIX TCP stacks.
SYN stage: The first step in the three-way TCP connection establishment handshake
concerned with the processing of a SYN. See also ACK stage.
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SynQ3/4Full: A rule dictating the dropping of a SYN segment because the SYN queue
is three-quarters full. Enforced at the SYN stage. See also ListenQFullAtSyn and
ListenQOverflow.
sysctl: An administrator-configurable parameter in Linux.
win-emu: Our emulation of the win-syn-retry behaviour in the Linux client TCP stack.
See also win-syn-retry.
win-syn-retry: Behaviour of some client TCP stacks, notably those on Windows op-
erating systems, which do not follow the recommendations of RFC 793 and retry a
SYN upon receiving a RST for a previous SYN.
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